

# ZIMBABWE

## THE FACTS ABOUT RHODESIA

International Defence & Aid Fund  
for Southern Africa


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


# **LAND DISTRIBUTION**

**Under  
Land  
Tenure Act  
1969**



## **AVERAGE ANNUAL RAINFALL**





# **ZIMBABWE**

## **The Facts About Rhodesia**



International Defence & Aid Fund  
104 Newgate Street, London EC1  
November 1977



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1. To aid, defend and rehabilitate the victims of unjust legislation and oppressive and arbitrary procedures;
2. To support their families and dependants;
3. To keep the conscience of the world alive to the issues at stake.

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# Contents

I	The Historical Background .....	5
II	Racial Discrimination and the Economy .....	9
III	White Supremacy and The Constitution .....	25
IV	The Liberation Movement .....	30
V	The Denial of Rights and Freedoms .....	34
VI	The Armed Struggle .....	45
VII	Attempts at a Settlement .....	63
	Illustrations .....	facing 40



# Contents

1	I The Island of Oenone
2	II The Island of Oenone
3	III The Island of Oenone
4	IV The Island of Oenone
5	V The Island of Oenone
6	VI The Island of Oenone
7	VII The Island of Oenone

8	VIII The Island of Oenone
9	IX The Island of Oenone
10	X The Island of Oenone
11	XI The Island of Oenone
12	XII The Island of Oenone



# **I The Historical Background**

## **ZIMBABWE AND RHODESIA**

Zimbabwe is the African name for Rhodesia. It is nowadays commonly used both by those who live in Rhodesia and others outside it, and will be the official name of the country when majority rule is achieved.

The name Zimbabwe is taken from the massive stone ruins of Great Zimbabwe, near Fort Victoria, in the south-east part of the country. For many years Great Zimbabwe was the centre of a thriving precolonial civilization which extended over much of central and south-central Africa.

The name Rhodesia derives from that of Cecil John Rhodes, who with his followers was largely responsible for setting up the white settler society which persists to this day. Rhodesia is sometimes referred to as Southern Rhodesia—legally this is still its official name. It is still a British colony and the British government retains responsibility for its inhabitants and their future. For nearly a century, the country has been controlled by a small minority in defiance of the wishes of the people as a whole and, particularly since 1965, of world opinion.

## **WHITE SETTLER CONQUEST**

Until the late 19th century, the region of Africa in which present day Rhodesia is situated was administered by a succession of African political systems, each with its own history and culture. Europeans, who first settled in what is now South Africa in the 17th century, gradually penetrated northwards in search of land and mineral wealth. In September 1890 a small group of white settlers and mineral prospectors, accompanied by their own private armed police force, marched into Mashonaland (the north and north-eastern part of Zimbabwe) from Bechuanaland (now Botswana). They set up camp at Harare (now Salisbury), where they staked their claim to the territory by hoisting up the British flag.

The invaders, known as the Pioneer Column, were organised by Cecil John Rhodes, the founder of the British South Africa Company. Rhodes, who had already amassed a huge personal fortune in the diamond mines of South Africa, saw exciting possibilities for further mineral exploration in Zimbabwe and had persuaded the British government to grant a Royal Charter to his company entitling it to govern and administer the territory. Lobengula, an African ruler of the region, found that the charter's terms were far more sweeping than anything previous suggested by Rhodes' agents. Resentment and resistance grew as the African people found themselves being evicted from their homes and lands and pressganged into working for the settlers.



With the backing of superior arms and military strength, however, the white settlers quickly entrenched themselves in the territory. In 1893 Rhodes' forces attacked the Ndebele, one of the two main African linguistic groupings in Zimbabwe, with much loss of life on both sides. In 1896 and again in 1897 the Ndebele united with the Shona, the other main component of Zimbabwe's African population, to fight the invaders. In the face of considerable military assistance from the British government, however, they were eventually defeated by the settlers.

## COLONIAL RULE

The British South Africa Company continued to administer Zimbabwe until 1923, when the British government granted the settlers what was described as "responsible self-government"—despite the fact that the African majority was neither consulted nor permitted to participate in the plans. The white population had previously voted in a referendum against being incorporated into South Africa.

Zimbabwe, despite its status as a British colony in Africa, was never administered directly by the British colonial office. It was during these early years that the systematic racial discrimination and the exclusion of the African people from the political process that characterise the country today were introduced and consolidated. Britain, while retaining certain powers after 1923,—such as a right of veto over legislation which discriminated against the African majority—never effectively exercised them. The white settler government was left very much to its own devices.

## UDI

In 1953, after thirty years of "responsible self-government", Southern Rhodesia joined with Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi) to form the Central African Federation. The move was strongly opposed by the African nationalist movement. In 1964 Malawi was granted its independence, to be followed shortly after by Zambia, and the Federation broke up. The white settler government of Southern Rhodesia also attempted to negotiate its independence from Britain, but on terms which were quite unacceptable to the African people.

The British government, for its part, was for historical and economic reasons unwilling to alienate the white settlers, many of whom had influential contacts in London. The settlers had in any case been in effective control of Zimbabwe for the best part of half a century. For this reason Britain failed to take the decisive steps needed to confer independence on Zimbabwe on the same basis as other British colonial territories in Africa—i.e. majority African rule.

Disagreements between the British government and the white settlers on the one hand, and between Britain and the increasingly articulate and united



African nationalist movement on the other, grew. On 11 November 1965 the white government led by Ian Smith—still at this stage a legal government in British eyes—unilaterally declared their independence from Britain. At the same time the settlers announced the introduction of the 1965 Constitution which, while maintaining the basic features of the existing 1961 Constitution, severed a number of the remaining links with Britain. The 1961 Constitution had held out the possibility of African majority rule, but in the far distant future.

The unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) was an illegal act; in law Southern Rhodesia remains a British colony and the Smith regime is not officially recognised by any other country in the world.

## POPULATION

According to figures released by the Smith regime, the population of Zimbabwe at 30 December 1976 was made up as follows:—

Africans	6,340,000
Whites	273,000
Asians	10,200
Coloureds (mixed race)	21,800
Total	6,645,000

(*Central Statistical Office, Salisbury, Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics April 1977*).

*Note*: White, Asians and Coloureds are all grouped together as “Europeans” by the regime.

At the end of December 1975, there were estimated to be 6,110,000 Africans in Zimbabwe, and 278,000 whites. Since that time, the white population has been steadily depleted by emigration, prompted by escalating guerilla warfare and general political and economic uncertainty. During the first five months of 1977, the white population experienced a further net loss of some 4,900 people by emigration reducing it (after allowing for natural increase by births) to about 270,000 or less. (*Financial Times* 28/6/77).

The regime's official statistics almost certainly do not take account of the many thousands of Africans who have crossed the borders into the neighbouring countries of Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania as refugees or to join the forces of the national liberation movement. During 1976, between 10,000 and 14,000 Zimbabwean refugees are believed to have entered Botswana, while in Mozambique, an estimated 50,000 people were in 1977 housed in four camps set up for non-combatant refugees by the Mozambique government and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. (*See also under REFUGEES*).



## IMMIGRATION

Since seizing power, the Smith regime has expended considerable effort in attracting white immigrants to Rhodesia with the lure of well-paid jobs and a "spacious" style of life. The peak year for this policy was 1971, when 14,743 whites entered the country, a net gain of 9,400. During 1976, however, there were only 7,782 white immigrants, many of whom may have been single men recruited into the regime's security forces, while 14,854 white people left, a net loss of 7,072. The announcement in July 1976 of stringent budgetary controls, including cutting the amount of money a would-be emigrant can take out of the country from Rh \$5,000 to Rh \$1,000, has had little effect in slowing the white outflow. (One Rhodesian dollar was estimated at about £0.95 in 1977).

By contrast with whites, the Smith regime does not normally allow Asian and Coloured immigrants into Rhodesia. During the first six months of 1976, 59 Asians and Coloureds entered the country, while 69 left. Foreign Africans, notably from Mozambique and Malawi, have traditionally been allowed in to seek employment, one reason being that they have been prepared to accept even lower wages than indigenous Africans. The numbers travelling in and out of the country, however, have declined over the last two decades. In 1957, a peak year, 115,700 foreign African men entered what was then Southern Rhodesia, and 114,300 left. In 1976 the comparable figures were 6,280 and 3,250. On the basis of a census carried out by the regime in 1969, upwards of 300,000 foreign Africans are estimated to be living in Zimbabwe at any one time.

### Country of Origin

It has often been argued that Rhodesia's white minority are the "kith and kin" of British people. In fact, only a limited number are of British origin. Britain has traditionally been an important source of white immigrants to the country, and in March 1976, Mr. Elly Broomberg, the regime's Minister of Information, Immigration and Tourism, confirmed that Britons still headed the list of those receiving assisted passages to Rhodesia. No statistical information on the country of origin of white immigrants, however, has been published by the regime since 1969. South Africa has always been an important source of white immigrants; since the fall of the Caetano regime in Portugal in 1974, and the establishment of independent African governments in Mozambique and Angola, a large proportion have been of Portuguese origin. There are now estimated to be between 20,000 and 30,000 Portuguese in Zimbabwe, compared to about 4,000 at the time of the 1969 census. Since 1976 increasing numbers of recruits for the regime's security forces have been drawn from the U.S.A., Australia, New Zealand, Canada and a number of Western European countries as well as Britain.



## II Racial Discrimination and the Economy

### LAND ALLOCATION

Control of the land, and its unequal distribution on racial lines, is one of the most important sources of the wealth and power of the white minority in Zimbabwe today.

Soon after the first white settlers arrived in the country, they began to set aside reserves for the Africans and to evict black families from the land that they themselves wanted. In 1930, with the introduction of the Land Apportionment Act, segregation of the land was legally enforced. The Land Tenure Act of 1969, which replaced the Land Apportionment Act, consolidated the position still further by abolishing the unreserved land which up to that time had remained open to all races.

Thousands of Africans have been forcibly removed from their homes and lands as a result of these laws. The Tangwena people in particular, led by Chief Rekayi, have been fighting since 1964 for the right to stay on their farms in the Inyanga mountains in the east of Zimbabwe.

Under the Land Tenure Act an equal amount of land, approximately 45 million acres in each case, is allocated to the Africans and the Europeans. This works out, in theory, at around 7 acres for each black person, compared with 147 acres for a white. (In practice, most of the European land is concentrated in a very few hands, with huge farms being owned by a comparatively small number of the wealthiest white farmers and businessmen). An additional 6 million acres are designated as National Land, consisting of national parks and game reserves.

The distribution of land has been carried out in such a way as to leave the whites in control of the most economically developed and productive areas. The maps on the inside and back covers illustrate how the European land includes all the towns and industrial areas, main road and rail links and the agricultural regions with the most favourable climatic conditions. Until April 1977, no African was allowed to own property or live in a white area, except on special terms, and whites were similarly precluded from living in black areas. Certain relaxations in the land laws enacted in 1977 are likely to have only a minimal effect on the situation in practice (*see under RECENT REFORMS*).

### LAND OWNERSHIP

Even within the areas set aside for them by the regime, Africans are severely restricted by law in the use they make of the land.

Around 90% of the 45 million acres allocated to the black majority is made up



of Tribal Trust Lands, and the remaining 10% of African Purchase Areas. Africans are only allowed to buy and own land individually in the African Purchase Areas, whose purpose is to encourage the development of a limited number of cash crop farmers. (Under the Land Tenure Amendment Act of 1977 African farmers and businessmen who have the necessary resources can now purchase land in white areas, while whites are also permitted to buy African Purchase Area farms)—(see under *RECENT REFORMS*).

The Tribal Trust Lands, supporting the vast majority of the rural African population, are occupied communally and farmed on a subsistence basis. The regime provides only very limited funds for economic development in the Tribal Trust Lands. The land is generally poor and eroded, and food production stagnant and even declining. In the white areas, on the other hand, huge tracts of potentially productive agricultural land lie unused.

Areas in the Tribal Trust Lands can be expropriated from the Africans without compensation in the event of a mining claim being established. White mining speculators, who are free to prospect in the TTL's, are able to make compulsory purchase of any land required for mining development.

Under the 1969 Constitution, Asians and Coloureds are officially classified, along with Whites, as Europeans. While this means that, in theory, they may purchase and occupy land on the same terms, various attempts have been made to prevent them from actually living in European areas. In December 1972, for example, the Deeds Act was amended to allow restrictive conditions to be included in title deeds for property.

## PROVINCIALISATION

Since 1972 the regime has been implementing a policy of "provincialisation" or "regionalisation" which contains many features similar to the South African Bantustan system.

The nation is divided by the regime into three groups—whites, Mashona and Matabele—on the basis of the existing division of land into European and African areas. By delegating greater local government powers to chiefs and tribal authorities, and emphasising the differences between the two main African groupings, the regime's aim is to encourage a narrow tribal identity among the black people.

In the African areas eight Provincial Authorities consisting of chiefs have been established as part of this programme, with responsibilities for projects such as dam building, road improvement and other development works areas, and the administration of certain aspects of educational and other social services. In June 1976, two Cabinet Councils, one for Mashonaland and one for Matabeleland, were set up following the appointment of a number of African chiefs to positions in the Rhodesian Front government (see under *PARLIAMENT*). These are linked in a Joint Central Council.



The Provincial Authorities have jurisdiction over 241 African Councils (in June 1977) consisting of up to 12 members appointed through a tribal system. Councils are presided over by white District Commissioners, while the chief of the area is the vice-president. (*Rhodesia Herald* 6/17/6/77).

They are responsible for running schools, clinics, market places, beerhalls and other facilities.

Sections of the Rhodesian Front have argued that provincialisation should be extended into a full-scale system of bantustans or "cantons". The Rhodesian Action Party, formed in July 1977 out of a split within the Rhodesian Front, has included this among its objectives.

## URBAN AREAS

All the main towns in Rhodesia, and hence nearly all the country's industry and commerce, are in European areas. For many Africans, however, the towns are the only place where there is a chance of earning a living.

The general policy of successive governments, including the present regime, has been to allow Africans to live in urban areas only if they are in employment. Two types of accommodation have been provided for African workers: locations which house "unmarried workers", and urban townships where families are allowed to live. Africans who are not lawfully residing or employed in an urban area can be expelled by the authorities. Under the African (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act, for example, it is illegal for the family of an African domestic servant to live with him or her in a European suburb without official permission.

The African townships are overcrowded and in many cases are squalid slums. In many there is no domestic electricity, water has to be fetched from a tap in the street and sanitary facilities are very primitive. Few entertainment or recreational facilities exist (except municipally-owned beerhalls) and schools and other social services are inadequate. The townships are strategically designed to minimise the threat of African political activity: most are located several miles from white business districts and suburbs; water and electricity can be cut off in the event of strikes or demonstrations; access roads are limited and can be easily controlled by road blocks.

In Salisbury there is a small township called Marimba Park where a small number of better-off African families own European-style houses; it is regularly shown by the regime to overseas visitors.

Africans are forbidden to own land or to live in areas set aside for white residential use in the towns (this ruling has not been affected by the reforms brought in under the 1977 Land Tenure Amendment Act). In July 1977, despite undertakings by the regime to eliminate "unnecessary" racial discrimination, a number of African and Coloured families were evicted from Salisbury's white Houghton Park suburb after they had bought houses there.



## ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

Zimbabwe under white minority rule has an economic structure consisting on the one hand, of a relatively sophisticated, industrialised cash sector owned and controlled by the whites, and on the other, a huge under-developed subsistence sector based on the Tribal Trust Lands.

To produce a supply of cheap African labour the whites have introduced a system of laws and taxes which forces Africans to enter into the cash economy and work in white-owned agriculture, industry and trade, and as domestic servants in white homes. The vast majority of black workers perform unskilled or semi-skilled manual jobs, at very low rates of pay. White control of land and capital, their monopoly of skills, technical training and expertise, and the denial of trade union rights to black workers, mean that Africans have little chance of economic advancement. In 1977, for example, 6,000 white Rhodesian farmers had access to over R\$100 million worth of credit facilities, whereas a mere R\$1 million was made available by the regime to 8,000 African Purchase Area farmers and an estimated 600,000 farming families in the TTL's. (*Financial Mail, Johannesburg* 25/2/77). Well-off African businessmen, often owning bus companies or stores in the African townships, do exist in Zimbabwe, but compared with the overall mass of black workers, their numbers are insignificant.

Most detailed information on the state of the economy—production figures, imports and exports, the activities of foreign companies operating in Zimbabwe, and so on—has been withheld by the regime since the imposition of international sanctions shortly after UDI. However while the Tribal Trust Lands have remained largely stagnant, the white farming and industrial economy has continued to expand since 1965. Various methods have been devised to overcome transport difficulties and shortages arising out of sanctions. In 1976, by means of tight restrictions on foreign exchange allocations and the export of Rhodesian currency, and by drastically cutting down on imports other than armaments and military supplies, the regime achieved a record trade surplus of R\$176.1 million (R\$47.6 million in 1975). An R\$118 million deficit in the balance of payments was transformed into an R\$17.7 million surplus. (*Rhodesia Herald* 6/5/77). Acute shortages of white manpower due to military call-up, and the disruption of commercial agriculture, tourism and transport and distribution services, in particular, by guerilla activity, are proving far more serious problems to the regime.

The main sectors of the economy are:—

Manufacturing:

Textiles, foodstuffs, clothing and footwear, furniture, light and heavy industry.

Agriculture:

Tobacco was Rhodesia's main agricultural export at the time of UDI. Cotton, wheat and maize production have since been considerably expanded. Cattle-ranching, timber, tea, sugar and citrus fruit are also important. In recent



months, however, many white farms have been run down and even abandoned as a result of guerilla activity.

**Mining:**

Main minerals include copper, gold, chrome, asbestos, nickel, coal and iron. The mining sector has expanded most dramatically of all since UDI. In 1976, mineral production rose to a record value of over R\$230 million, compared with around R\$46 million in 1963. (*Rhodesia Herald* 8/2/77).

**Tourism:**

Tourist centres include Victoria Falls, Kariba, the Wankie game reserve and Zimbabwe ruins. They have been seriously affected by the upsurge in guerilla activity and many hotels have been forced to close.

*Table: Industrial Origin of the Gross Domestic Product in 1975.*

	R \$ million	%
Manufacturing	474.5	24.8
Agriculture—White	216.3	16.3
—African	95.2	
Distribution, hotels and restaurants	260.5	13.6
Mining and quarrying	132.5	6.9
Public administration	122.8	6.4
Construction	106.7	5.6
Others	501.1	26.2
Total	1909.6	99.8

(Source: *Rhodesian Ministry of Finance—Economic Survey of Rhodesia* 1975).

## FOREIGN INVESTMENT

The Rhodesian economy was developed over the years following the first white settlement, and particularly since World War II, through massive inputs of foreign capital. Most of this was of British origin. Overseas interests amounted to around two-thirds of total investment in the early 1960's, the last period for which reliable statistics are available.

Since UDI, multinational companies with their headquarters in Britain, the USA and other Western countries have continued to operate and make profits inside Zimbabwe. Without them, the white minority would not have been able to survive. During 1975, probably a record year, the economy attracted a net capital inflow of over R\$100 million (around £95 million. In 1976 it dropped to around £24 million). (*Rhodesia Herald* 29/6/76; *Financial Times* 6/5/77).



Most of this foreign investment has come from South Africa or via the South African subsidiaries of overseas multinationals. South African involvement in all areas of the Rhodesian economy has increased substantially, although precise figures are not available. It has been estimated that South African capital holdings in the Rhodesian economy doubled over the decade following UDI (*"Rhodesia—South Africa's Sixth Province"* I.D.A.F. 1974 p. 56). The Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Limited, under its Chairman Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, is the main South African company operating in Zimbabwe.

Well known British companies with interests in Zimbabwe include the Rio Tinto—Zinc Corporation Limited (mining), Tate and Lyle Company Limited (sugar production), Barclays Bank International (banking services), Lonrho Limited (textiles, mining, timber production and cattle-ranching), Turner and Newall Limited (asbestos mining) and the British-American Tobacco Company Limited (tobacco processing).

US companies include the Union Carbide Corporation (chrome mining), Lever Brothers Inc. (foods, toiletries and detergents), American Metal Climax Inc. (AMAX) (lithium mining), Hoover Company (household appliances) and Baker Perkins Inc. (industrial machinery).

## UNEMPLOYMENT

It is estimated that tens of thousands of Africans in Zimbabwe are without work.

The white settlers built up a sophisticated industrial and farming economy on the strength of freely available African labour, but have never needed more than a small proportion of the potential manpower. In 1976, a total of 926,000 Africans were employed in the cash economy, a mere 14.6% of the total African population, compared with 120,000 whites, Asians and Coloureds (40% of the total). The regime expects the remainder to support themselves and their families by farming in the economically underdeveloped and impoverished Tribal Trust Lands.

No figures of African unemployment are issued by the regime, but it has been calculated that 131,000 African men aged between 16 and 60 were unemployed in 1975, and that at least 54,000 new jobs would need to be created every year to absorb black school leavers and others entering the job market. (*Financial Mail, Johannesburg* 13/8/76, *commenting on research into unemployment by Dr. Duncan Clarke, formerly of the University of Rhodesia*). The regime makes no provision for unemployment benefit to be paid to either black or white workers.

The scale of black unemployment has been masked in recent years by the large numbers of young Africans who have left Zimbabwe for exile in Mozambique, Botswana and other neighbouring countries. Many other black workers have migrated to South Africa to work in the mines or as domestic servants.

The Smith regime denies that there is any such thing as African unemployment on the grounds that jobs can always be found in the mining and farming



sectors. These are so poorly paid, however, that many Zimbabweans refuse to take them. In recent months too, many African farm workers have abandoned their white employers to join the armed liberation struggle.

In order to fill the vacancies without raising wages, legislation was passed by the regime in July 1976 prohibiting the employment of migrant African workers from Malawi and elsewhere, other than on white farms and mines. (See also under *IMMIGRATION*).

## **SKILLS AND TRAINING**

The vast majority of black workers in Zimbabwe are in unskilled or semi-skilled occupations and opportunities for higher training are restricted. White employers and white workers together form a powerful block to African advancement.

The Apprenticeship Act of 1959 allowed African apprenticeship for the first time, but the numbers involved are very small. In 1975 the apprenticeship intake was 1,211, of whom 840 were whites, 145 Asians and Coloureds, and 226 Africans. (*Rhodesian Financial Gazette* 5/9/75).

Apart from a small number of black lawyers and doctors, teaching is the main professional career open to those Africans who complete secondary school. (See also under *EDUCATION*).

The regime has always tried to encourage further white immigration to fill skilled jobs, rather than train local Africans. In fact, as the war has escalated, many white professionals and intellectuals have left the country, creating acute shortages of manpower in key areas such as medicine and veterinary services. Ironically, the ranks of the liberation movement and exile community contain many hundreds of highly trained and educated black Zimbabweans who have obtained university degrees and professional qualifications overseas or while being detained without charge or trial by the regime. The African nationalist delegations who attended the Geneva constitutional conference at the end of 1976 certainly included many more university graduates than Mr. Smith's Rhodesian Front Cabinet.

In terms of a special project which began in 1967, the International Defence and Aid Fund has provided over 2,000 correspondence courses for men and women held in detention without charge by the regime. The courses range from primary school subjects to graduate and postgraduate studies.

## **WAGES**

White wages in Zimbabwe are nearly eleven times greater than Black, and the Black-White wage gap is growing.

In 1976, Africans employed in the white owned economy in Zimbabwe earned average annual incomes of R \$517. (One Rhodesian dollar was estimated at about 95p in mid 1977). White, Asian and Coloured employees, on the other hand



earned on average R\$5,583. The gap between average African and non-African wages has increased from R\$2,809 in 1970 to R\$5,066 in 1976.

Even these figures underplay the discrepancies in wealth and income between the white minority and the rest of the population. Many whites, such as farmers and businessmen, are self-employed and therefore do not figure in the tables of wage earnings published by the regime's Central Statistical Office in Salisbury. Their incomes are in most cases considerably higher. An analysis of the returns of individual tax-payers for the fiscal year 1974-5, for example, carried out by a Salisbury income tax consultant, revealed average annual incomes in the mining and agricultural sectors of R\$16,676 and R\$10,544 respectively. (While these figures are derived from the returns of tax-payers of all races, the number of Africans involved is extremely small; out of a total of 100,656 individual tax payers in 1976, only 4,072 (4%) were Africans, in a country where Africans outnumber whites by 23 to 1). (*Rhodesia Herald* 22/1/76; *Rand Daily Mail* 23/12/76).

Overall figures for African wages disguise the plight of the lowest paid too. According to a report from the regime's Statistical Office, more than 122,000 Africans, the majority of them employed in agriculture and forestry, earned less than R\$10 a month in 1977—about £9.50. Most of those employed in private domestic service earned between R\$10 and R\$20 a month, while most of those employed in mining and quarrying earned between R\$20 and R\$30 a month. (*Rhodesia Herald* 10/3/77; see also the table of *Earnings and Employment* below).

Many Africans, of course, are not employed in the cash economy at all, but depend on subsistence agriculture in the impoverished Tribal Trust Lands. Standards of living here are even lower than those of the majority of Africans employed in the industrial sector.


*Table: Earnings and Employment by Race, 1976. (Note: Non-Africans include whites, Asians & Coloureds).*

		<i>Total employed:</i>	<i>Average annual earnings (R\$):</i>
<i>Industrial sectors:</i>			
Agriculture and forestry	Africans	356,100	201
	Non-Africans	5,900	4,915
Mining and quarrying	Africans	61,400	567
	Non-Africans	3,900	7,590
Manufacturing	Africans	131,000	805
	Non-Africans	21,900	6,347
Private domestic Service	Africans	126,000	392
	Non-Africans	—	—
<i>All sectors</i>	Africans	926,000	517
	Non-Africans	120,000	5,583

(Source: *Monthly Digest of Statistics, Supplement: April 1977*).



### Employment by Race, 1976




No of  
employees:

**Africans 920,000**

**Europeans 120,000      Total 1,040,000**

---

### Earnings by Race, 1976



Earnings:

**Africans: R\$479.7 million**

**Europeans: R\$673.3 million**

**Total: R\$1,153.0 million**

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*(Source : Monthly Digest of Statistics)*



## THE COST OF LIVING

Rhodesian whites often claim that "their" Africans are economically better off than the inhabitants of many other African countries where average cash incomes are demonstrably lower. This kind of comparison not only ignores the massive wage gap between blacks and whites, but also the cost of living in what is one of the most highly industrialised countries of Africa.

In fact, thousands of Africans in Zimbabwe are living below the poverty line. It has been estimated that the minimum income required for basic subsistence needs by a couple without children in June 1975 was R\$39.79 a month. Yet at that time, and excluding those employed in the agricultural sector (who earned even less), 56.1% of African workers were estimated to be earning a monthly cash wage of less than R\$40. (*Financial Mail, Johannesburg* 3/12/76). Prices of food, fuel, rent and other essentials, furthermore, have tended to rise more rapidly than other goods, meaning that Africans have been hit harder by inflation than many white families.

## TRADE UNIONS

The rights of Africans to organise in trade unions in Zimbabwe are restricted by complex legal constraints.

The major items of legislation are the Masters and Servants Act of 1901 and the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934 as amended. The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act also contains numerous powers which are used to regulate trade union activity.

Under the Masters and Servants Act, which governs the employment of domestic servants and workers in forestry and agriculture (52% of the total African work force), workers are denied the right to form or join trade unions. Under the Act employees who are disobedient or neglectful can be imprisoned or fined.

The Industrial Conciliation Act was amended in 1959 to extend the definition of "employee" to certain categories of African workers, mainly in manufacturing and trade. This in turn gave them the right to form or join trade unions. However, this right is hedged about with all kinds of restrictions affecting black workers. Before a trade union can be registered under the Act and gain official recognition, various conditions must be satisfied. It is illegal for example to set up a union catering for workers in more than one industry. The Registrar of Trade Unions is vested with wide disciplinary powers, in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act, which are used against African unions. In March 1976, for example, the Registrar decided to strike the Rhodesia Commercial and Allied Workers' Union, one of the oldest established African trade unions with a membership of over 8,000 workers, off the register.



Employers are instructed by the regime to ignore representations by officials of unregistered African trade unions.

While the Industrial Conciliation Act does not preclude multi-racial unions, in practice the trade union movement is racially segregated. Voting rights in unions which include black members are defined in such a way as to guarantee white workers' domination. White workers are organised into the Trades Union Congress of Rhodesia, wielding considerable influence with employers and with the regime.

The overall effect of the legislation governing the African work force is to make it virtually impossible for black trade unions to function. In 1974 it was estimated that 42,000 members of African-led trade unions—less than 5% of the total black workforce—were governed by agreements obtained through union negotiations. (*Free Labour World*, October 1974).

## INDUSTRIAL ACTION

Rhodesian labour and security laws make it virtually impossible for black workers to go on strike legally.

Under the Industrial Conciliation Act conditions are laid down for the resolving of industrial disputes through a system of industrial councils and industrial boards, heavily weighted in favour of the regime and white employers. Under the Masters and Servants Act, black agricultural workers and domestic servants are liable to up to one month's imprisonment for any act of disobedience, including that of performing duties "carelessly or improperly", or being "abusive or insulting" to an employer's wife or children. Under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act it is a criminal offence liable to 5 years imprisonment to be involved in any action which "hinders or interferes with the carrying on of any essential service". These are defined so broadly that few areas of employment are excluded. Under the Industrial Conciliation Act, strikes are specifically prohibited in the light, power, water sanitation and fire services. Many other restrictions exist under both the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and the Emergency Regulations.

In practice many trade unionists have been detained or restricted, the Unlawful Organisations Act has been used to ban trade unions and the police have brutally suppressed strikes by African workers. In December 1976, for example, nearly 800 black bus drivers, conductors and mechanics were arrested and held in prison outside Salisbury over the Christmas holiday for taking part in a strike. The workers, all employees of the Salisbury United Omnibus Company, were immediately arrested by the police when they staged a walk-out after negotiations to secure a wage rise had broken down. They were all charged and fined under the Industrial Conciliation Act and in the vast majority of cases dismissed from their jobs.



## ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Economic sanctions have manifestly failed to change the policies or practices of the Rhodesian regime. Countries such as Mozambique and Zambia, on the other hand, have paid a heavy price for their decision to enforce sanctions.

Britain made it clear at the time of UDI that it was not prepared to use force to bring down the Smith regime but would support a policy of economic sanctions to persuade it to return to legality. However, this only took effect gradually. Mandatory sanctions were initially introduced by the United Nations in December 1965, when a selective embargo on supplies of oil, arms and military equipment, aircraft and motor vehicles to the regime, initiated by Britain, was made binding on all UN member states. (The original United Nations sanctions order against Rhodesia introduced a few days after UDI on 20 November 1965 had been purely voluntary in character). It was not until May 1968, nearly three years after UDI, that comprehensive mandatory sanctions on trade and investment with the regime were imposed (UN Security Council Resolution 253 (1968)). These were extended in April 1976 to cover insurance transactions, the use of trademarks and registered designs, and commercial and industrial franchises (UN Security Council Resolution 388 (1967)), and again in May 1977 to block the transfer of funds by the regime to any of its offices or agencies abroad (Resolution 409 (1977)). The 1977 resolution was intended to force the closure of Rhodesian information offices in Washington, Paris and Sydney.

While claiming to support sanctions, Britain has in fact opposed resolutions at the United Nations Security Council designed to tighten the embargo, and helped to delay making it fully comprehensive. In particular, Britain has been unwilling to jeopardise its extensive trading and investment interests in South Africa by supporting any move which might bring it into conflict with the apartheid government. Most recently, Britain, along with France and the United States, has vetoed UN moves to impose a mandatory ban on postal, telegraphic, radio and other communications with the regime, and to deny landing rights to aircraft carrying passengers and goods to and from Rhodesia.

## SANCTIONS BREAKING

The Smith regime could not have survived for so long unless sanctions had been broken or evaded on a massive scale.

The Rhodesian economy has been able to sell all its major exports and also to import most essential goods. It has been able to raise large sums for investment on the international capital market. In fact, while sanctions have led to many shortages, they may in some respects have helped to strengthen the economy by forcing Rhodesian firms to develop local substitutes for scarce and expensive foreign imports. They have clearly not brought about the collapse of the Smith regime although they have contributed to the long-term weakening of white minority rule.



United Nations sanctions are binding in the sense that any member state which trades with Rhodesia, except for a number of specified products which are exempted for humanitarian reasons, is acting in violation of Article 25 of the UN Charter. A Sanctions Committee set up by the Security Council in 1968 receives reports of sanctions breaking and requires member states involved to explain or take action in such cases. However it is left to individual states to enact and enforce appropriate legislation on their own nationals. There have always been many loopholes in the law. The piecemeal fashion in which sanctions were gradually introduced furthermore, gave Rhodesian businessmen and overseas companies with interests in Rhodesia plenty of time to devise ways and means of getting around them.

South Africa, in particular, has always made clear its commitment to maintaining "normal trading relations" with Rhodesia and if necessary, to help out in particular instances. South Africa enabled the regime to overcome an embargo imposed on oil and petrol supplies through Mozambique shortly after UDI, for example, by organising a road lift across the Beit Bridge. Along with Portugal up to the time of the Caetano regime's collapse in 1974, it has defied all UN resolutions relating to Rhodesia. During 1974, according to UN records, Rhodesia exported US \$600 million worth of goods, nearly half of which reached world markets through South Africa.

Many other countries have continued trading relations with Rhodesia. They include the United States, which up to the repeal of the controversial Byrd Amendment in March 1977 explicitly allowed the importing of chrome and other strategic minerals, and Switzerland, a non-member of the UN which has maintained trade with Rhodesia at pre-UDI levels. Exposures of sanctions-breaking operations have revealed that countries such as Japan, the Netherlands, Greece and West Germany have also been trading with Rhodesia.

Many well-known British companies have maintained subsidiaries in Rhodesia on the technical basis that they operate independently and have no formal contract with their British parent companies. The most serious allegations of sanctions breaking to have been made against British companies are that Shell and British Petroleum, along with a number of other international oil companies, have consistently supplied oil and petrol to the regime by making use of South African intermediaries. In April 1977 the British government announced that an official inquiry into oil sanctions-busting had been set up. Between May 1968 and June 1977, a total of 27 prosecutions were initiated against British nationals under the terms of the Southern Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) Order. (*The Times* 14/6/77).

## RACIAL SEGREGATION

Apart from some superficial differences, Rhodesian society is organised on the same lines as apartheid South Africa.

Apart from the major issues of land, labour, the economy and political activity



(see previous sections), there are few aspects of everyday life which are not affected by racial segregation, in most cases enforced by discriminatory laws. Health and education services are two such examples; in practice, marriage, entertainment and most sporting activities are also segregated.

## EDUCATION

The Smith regime claims that the education it provides for the black majority is one of the best in Africa. In fact, when compared with the facilities available for white children, it is grossly inferior. The system operates in such a way as to keep African people in a position of permanent disadvantage.

Education is segregated, with separate schools for each racial group; Africans Coloureds, Asians and whites. (Since April 1977, private schools—a minority—have been permitted to admit children of other races without limit if parents and school governors so wish. Only a minority of African families can afford or live within reach of white private schools however. Meanwhile State schools remain segregated.) There are two separate education departments, one for Africans and one for Asians, Coloureds and whites, who are grouped together as Europeans.

Whereas education is compulsory for white children and the fees relatively low, it is not enforced for Africans, whose parents in any case may well find the fees prohibitive. In 1976, probably over half of Zimbabwe's black population of at that time 6.6 million people were under the age of 15, yet only 846,260 of them were in primary school. More than half of all black children admitted to school drop out before completing their primary education, and only a tiny fraction, around 0.5% reach the sixth form. (*Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics*).

The regime spends over ten times as much on the education of a European child as on an African—in 1977 the figures were R\$557 and R\$46 per head respectively (*Financial Mail, Johannesburg* 25/2/77). African parents, as a group far poorer, are expected to make a much larger contribution to their children's education than are whites. African schools are overcrowded and the teachers are far less well qualified than their white counterparts.

With the upsurge in the guerilla war, many African schools, particularly mission schools, in the operational areas have been closed down by the authorities for security reasons. On top of this, thousands of children have been boycotting school as a form of protest or have escaped across the borders into neighbouring African countries.

## RECENT REFORMS

Since 1975, the Smith regime has introduced a number of superficial changes in Rhodesia's discriminatory laws, in an attempt to win over what it describes as "moderate" African opinion. These reforms, while making it easier for whites



and blacks to mix socially, and creating new opportunities for the better-off African farmers and businessmen to take part in the white-controlled economy, have left the political and economic power structure unaltered.

In July 1975, the regime announced that it was setting up a special body to study and report on ways of removing "unnecessary and undesirable" racial discrimination and segregation. The resulting Commission of Inquiry into Racial Discrimination, chaired by Sir Vincent Quenet, a former Judge President of the Appeal Court, and consisting of five other Europeans and five Africans, submitted its report in April 1976. Despite initial statements by Ian Smith welcoming the Commission's findings, its three main recommendations—that white agricultural, commercial and industrial land should be opened up to all races; the abolition of the separate black and white voters' rolls and a return to a common voters' roll; and the adoption of a Declaration of Rights which would be enforceable by law—were rejected out of hand by the regime in July 1976.

A number of other proposals for the removal of petty apartheid, however, have since been adopted; for example, a number of Africans have been admitted to officer grades in the army, police and prison service; schools are now permitted to introduce multi-racial sport if they so wish; local authorities have been instructed to make public lavatories non-racial; and identity cards are to be issued to members of all races instead of to Africans only.

Despite its initial reaction to the Quenet proposals for land ownership, the regime did later relax the Land Tenure Act. Its decision to do so precipitated a major split in the ruling group and the eventual formation of a new right-wing opposition party (*see under POLITICAL PARTIES*). Many of the more hardline members of the Rhodesian Front had greeted the Quenet Commission's proposals almost with horror, although the proposals were by no means radical.

Under the Land Tenure Amendment Act, which received its first reading in the House of Assembly in March 1977 and passed into law on 1 April on the strength of a bare two-thirds majority vote, Africans who have the cash and resources may now purchase and occupy agricultural land in the European Rural Area (previously reserved for white farmers), or land set aside for commerce and industry in urban areas. The African Purchase Areas have also been opened up for sale to all races. The Tribal Trust Lands however, are not affected by the Act, while about 500,000 acres of European residential land are to remain exclusively white for the time being. In May 1977 the first white farm to be sold to an African was bought by Mr. George Tawengwa, a prominent Marandellas businessman. The purchase price of R\$100,000, which Mr. Tawengwa paid in cash, amounts to nearly 200 times the average annual wage of a black Zimbabwean worker. (*Rhodesia Herald* 17/5/77).

Other provisions of the Land Tenure Amendment Act include the opening of private schools, hospitals and clinics to all races (white state-run institutions remain segregated, education remains compulsory for whites but not for blacks,



and educational spending is unchanged), and the abolition of discriminatory drinking laws under which hotels and restaurants were not permitted to serve Africans after 7.00 p.m. (although hotels retain their right to reserve admission to customers of their own choice). Other significant areas of racial discrimination not affected by recent reforms include the franchise and parliamentary representation, labour and industrial relations, and wage differentials.



### **III White Supremacy & The Constitution**

#### **THE PEOPLE IN POWER**

The Smith regime is composed of members or supporters of the all-white Rhodesian Front. The Front, which dominates the House of Assembly (the equivalent of the British House of Commons) was founded in 1961 and has been in power continuously since elections held in 1962. Throughout the entire period since UDI it has claimed the overwhelming support of the white population.

As a party, the Rhodesian Front claims to be pledged to the maintenance of "civilised standards" in Rhodesia and to retaining control of the government in "responsible" hands. According to spokesmen for the regime, this means that a form of meritocracy exists, and indeed many white Rhodesians pride themselves on the belief that the kind of systematic racialism enforced in apartheid South Africa is not found in Rhodesia, and that day-to-day relations between blacks and whites are friendly and relaxed. In practice, Rhodesian Front policies, rigidly enforced over 15 years, effectively confine the African majority to a position of perpetual economic and social inferiority and exclude them from political power for all time by suppressing all opposition to the white dominated status quo.

#### **THE CONSTITUTION**

In 1969, Rhodesia declared itself a Republic under the terms of the "1969 Constitution". This document, which came into operation on 3 March 1970 and remains in force today, reinforced and extended the existing system of racial discrimination and political repression even further.

The Constitution includes a guarantee that the white population will continue to monopolise political power for the foreseeable future. In theory, it allows for the number of African MPs in the Rhodesian Parliament to be increased as the African population contributes a greater percentage of taxes until parity (i.e. 50% African representation) is reached in the House of Assembly. In practice, the economic policies enforced by the regime ensure that this will never happen.

#### **THE FRANCHISE**

Rhodesian whites enjoy universal franchise and parliamentary government based on the British model. Asians and Coloureds are classified under the 1969 Constitution as European for the purpose of parliamentary representation, although there are no Coloured or Asian members of the House of Assembly. Africans, on the other hand, are almost totally excluded from the parliamentary system and are administered by civil servants answerable solely to the regime.



Successive white Rhodesian governments have always opposed the idea of "one person, one vote" and have effectively prevented Africans from voting by setting income, property and educational qualifications for inclusion on the electoral roll. The requirements are so high that the vast majority of Africans, economically under-privileged and denied educational opportunities, are automatically excluded. The franchise qualifications, moreover, are designed to rise automatically as the cost of living rises.

Under the 1969 Constitution, the common voters' roll was abolished and a separate African voters' roll established. In August 1977, when the regime called an election among those entitled to vote, a mere 7,478 Africans were reported to be on the electoral register, out of a total adult African population of about 2.4 million (about 0.3%). (*Sunday Telegraph* 24.7.77). Many Africans refuse to register and vote as a form of protest against the constitution.

The official claim is that the interests of Africans who are not qualified to vote are represented by eight tribal electoral colleges consisting of all the chiefs, headmen and elected councillors in each area. In practice, the political rights of Africans are systematically denied by discriminatory and repressive legislation, by emergency regulations and by the day-to-day actions of the army, police and employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (responsible for African administration), in addition to their exclusion from the franchise.

## PARLIAMENT

Under the regime's Constitution a President appointed by the Executive Council is the Head of State, and the Legislature consists of the Head of State and a Parliament comprising a Senate and House of Assembly.

The Senate is a 23-member body consisting of:

- (a) 10 European members elected by an electoral college of European members of the House of Assembly (i.e. in theory white, Asian or Coloured; in practice all the European members of the Senate, as of the House of Assembly, are white).
- (b) 10 African chiefs elected by the Council of Chiefs.
- (c) 3 persons (increased in 1974 to 5) of any race appointed by the Head of State.

The House of Assembly is a 66-member body consisting of:

- (a) 50 Europeans elected by the European electorate.
- (b) 8 Africans elected by registered African voters.
- (c) 8 Africans elected by eight tribal electoral colleges.

The most recent general election to be called by the regime was held in August 1977. All 50 European seats in the House of Assembly were won by the Rhodesian Front—the same result as in the previous election in July 1974—and the Front secured 86% of the European votes cast. (*BBC Monitoring Service* 3.9.77).



In April 1976, as part of a "new deal" for Africans involving the removal of certain discriminatory laws and practices, Ian Smith announced that ten Africans were to be brought into the Rhodesian government. Four of the existing Senator Chiefs would be granted full cabinet rank as Ministers of Development for those parts of Zimbabwe set aside for Africans, and a further six Africans would be appointed as deputy Ministers with similar responsibilities. The four African cabinet ministers and three of the proposed deputy ministers—the latter drawn from the eight tribally elected members of the House of Assembly—were sworn in on 28 April 1976, but the remaining three posts were still waiting to be filled more than a year later. None of the African ministers have any jurisdiction over white affairs, their function being to represent the "African point of view". (*Rhodesia Herald* 29.4.77).

In December 1976, two of the cabinet minister chiefs resigned to devote themselves to a new political party, the Zimbabwe United People's Organisation (ZUPO) (*see below under POLITICAL PARTIES*). They were not replaced.

## POLITICAL PARTIES

No political party outside of the African nationalist movement has ever posed a serious threat to the survival of the Rhodesian Front. Speculation that the Front and particularly Smith himself, might be losing their appeal for many white voters soon disappeared when the results of the August 1977 elections became known (*see above*). White opposition parties have remained small and ineffectual, and have in no case challenged the system of racial dominance. Black parties have often been no more than mouthpieces for the regime.

**Rhodesia Party (RP):** the major "moderate" opposition party to the Rhodesian Front in the 1974 general election; it polled 19% of the votes but failed to win a single seat. During the 1976 Geneva constitutional conference, the RP unsuccessfully lobbied for white parties other than the Rhodesian Front to be granted representation at the talks.

**Centre Party (CP):** a multi-racial party whose only successful candidate in the 1974 general election—an African—resigned shortly afterwards to work with the other elected African MPs, whose sympathies lay with the ANC. During 1976 the CP provoked some controversy by appearing to be keen to strengthen its contacts with the ANC, which had by that time divided into two organisations.

In January 1977 the Rhodesia Party and the Centre Party joined forces with the National Pledge Association to form an umbrella pressure group known as the **National Unifying Force (NUF)**. The National Pledge Association had been launched in May the previous year by a group of white businessmen and professionals as a campaign for the removal of racial discrimination. It maintained, however, that it should be left up to the white individual to decide whether or not he wished to integrate with Africans. Its advertisements showed blacks and whites working together and used the slogan "United we will win the war". The National Unifying Force, into which it merged, aimed to coordinate moderate



efforts to press for a negotiated settlement. The NUF contested 18 seats in the August 1977 elections and secured between 5 and 6% of the total European vote. (*Financial Times* 1.9.77).

**Rhodesian Action Party (RAP)**: a far-right opposition party formed in July 1977. The RAP is totally opposed to the idea of majority rule and has argued instead for a "federal" system modelled on South Africa's bantustans. Its candidates, who contested 47 out of 50 seats in the 1977 elections, called for the "ruthless prosecution" of the war against the national liberation movement and the outlawing of all organisations which in any way supported the armed struggle. (*Rhodesia Herald* 6.7.77).

The formation of the RAP is a reflection of the disagreements that have developed within the regime as the liberation war has developed, over the best way to preserve white power and privilege. These came to a head in the months following Ian Smith's broadcast of 24 September 1976, in which he claimed to have accepted the principle of majority rule within two years. Many whites felt that they had been sold out. In the following March, 12 of the 50 Rhodesian Front MPs in the House of Assembly withdrew from the party caucus in protest at moves by the regime to repeal certain racial laws; in particular, to open up white farming areas to Africans by amending the Land Tenure Act. One of the 12, Reg Cowper, had earlier resigned as Minister of Defence out of dissatisfaction with Ian Smith's handling of the war effort. The dissidents were eventually expelled from the Rhodesian Front and joined forces with members of the Rhodesian Action Movement, a right wing movement formed in August 1976 and claiming the support of many members of the security forces, to form the RAP. Despite speculation that the RAP might win a number of seats in the 1977 elections, it secured only 8½% of the European vote. (*Financial Times* 1.9.77).

There are a number of other extreme right-wing groupings. The **Rhodesia National Party**, the **Candour League**, the **United Conservative Party** and the **Southern Africa Solidarity Congress** of Rhodesia for example, all stand opposed to what they see as the liberalism and lack of guts of the Smith regime. The **Rhodesia White People's Party** was formed at the end of 1975 on the strength of links with neo-nazi groups in South Africa and the United States of America. It apparently involved a number of US immigrant members of the Rhodesian security forces.

Several small African political parties have been permitted to operate by the regime over the years. Since the end of 1976 the **Zimbabwe United People's Organisation (ZUPO)** has been given the most press publicity. ZUPO, an organisation of tribal chiefs and headmen set up with the help of the regime, has made concerted efforts to win recognition overseas and support for its policies of gradual reform and the removal of "unnecessary" racial discrimination. A statement issued by ZUPO at its inauguration in December 1976 said that the party was "assured of financial support from many quarters" (*Rhodesia Herald* 30.12.76) - funds which were soon put to use in a series of full page advertisements of its constitution and policies in the Rhodesian press. ZUPO has faith-



fully echoed Ian Smith in calling for a constitutional conference inside Zimbabwe, the retention of the Tribal Trust Lands and support for "traditional" African leaders. In June 1977 a three man delegation from ZUPO visited London to lobby at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference and had talks at the Foreign Office with the deputy under-secretary, Mr. John Graham (*Daily Telegraph* 11.6.77). ZUPO has been universally condemned by the nationalist movement as a stooge of the regime.

Other African parties include the **Rhodesian African Progressive Union**, the **Rhodesia Democratic Union**, the **Anti-Terrorist Movement** and the **National Settlement Forum**, all of which have supported the idea of an "internal settlement" with moderate African opinion.

## THE CHIEFS

The African chiefs were traditionally the leaders of the African people and in many cases led the resistance to white colonisation in the 19th century. Since that time, however, the role of the chiefs has changed dramatically.

The chiefs depend on the white authorities for their official positions and are appointed and paid by the regime. Following the coming to power of the Rhodesian Front, in particular, the chiefs have been used to implement government policy. Their statutory duties include the allocation of land in the Tribal Trust areas under the terms of the Land Tenure Act, and the maintenance of law and order, for example by reporting all "strangers" to the authorities. In March 1976, the chiefs were designated as district authorities under the terms of the Emergency Powers Regulations, and given powers of summary punishment and arrest without warrant. (*Rhodesia Herald* 31.3.76). (See also under *PROVINCIALIZATION*).

Chiefs who have resisted the role demanded of them by the regime have been deposed or fined or imprisoned. Those who have fallen in with official policies, particularly chiefs in Shona-speaking areas who are mostly very old and lacking in education, have now lost most of their former standing in the eyes of the African people. In recent years a number of the officially recognised chiefs have been attacked by guerilla fighters, and the regime has taken steps to provide them with bodyguards.

The institution of chiefship has also been used by the regime to promote the idea that the African people are deeply divided among themselves on tribal lines and not yet sufficiently advanced to take part in Western-style democracy.



## IV The Liberation Movement

### THE NATIONALIST PARTIES

The fight for freedom and independence in Zimbabwe began nearly a century ago. Throughout that time organizations and political parties which have sought to organise the African people in defence of their rights have been harassed and suppressed by successive white governments.

The defeat suffered by the African people against the superior force of arms of the white settlers in the 1890's meant the end of one phase of resistance and the beginning of another. Various opposition groups were subsequently formed to press for political participation and better working conditions for Africans. These helped to cement resistance and formed the basis for the fully-fledged nationalist activity which developed in the 1950's. On 12 September 1957, the **Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (SRANC)** was founded as a country-wide African nationalist party demanding "one man, one vote". It was based on an earlier organization that had been started in 1934, and the Youth League, formed in Salisbury in 1955. The first president of the SRANC was Joshua Nkomo.

Two years later, in 1959, when a state of emergency was declared throughout the Federation, the SRANC was banned, 500 of its leading members were arrested, and many detained. In 1961 the **National Democratic Party**, formed by former leaders of the SRANC, was also banned. At this time, African nationalist activity was concentrated on the attempt to bring about change through constitutional means. The National Democratic Party participated in the 1961 constitutional conference in London as the accepted voice of African opinion.

### ZIMBABWE AFRICAN PEOPLE'S UNION (ZAPU)

The **Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)** was founded in December 1961 as the successor to the National Democratic Party (NDP). Its president is Joshua Nkomo who was detained from 1964, along with many other ZAPU officials and members, until his release in December 1974.

ZAPU itself was banned on 19 September 1962 under the Unlawful Organizations Act. Since that time, its members have continued to work underground in Zimbabwe, mobilising resistance to the regime and, since UDI, support for the armed struggle. Between August 1963 and August 1964, ZAPU leaders regrouped to form the **People's Caretaker Council**, while maintaining and developing the ZAPU structure underground.



## ZIMBAWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION (ZANU)

The **Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)** was founded in August 1963 under the leadership of the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole. Rev. Sithole, together with a number of other ZAPU leaders and supporters, broke away from ZAPU at this time. The split reflected various differences of opinion and frustrations within the nationalist movement, which were aggravated by the apparent lack of progress towards majority rule.

As with ZAPU, many ZANU leaders and members have been arrested and detained over the years by the Smith regime. Others have been forced into exile, while political work has continued underground inside the country. The white authorities have always gone to considerable lengths to isolate members of the two organizations in separate prisons and detention camps, so that there may be no communication between them. Rev. Sithole was detained from 1964 to 1971, when he was sentenced to six years imprisonment on a charge of plotting to assassinate leading Rhodesian Front ministers. He was released in December 1974 to attend talks in Lusaka. ZANU itself was banned on 26 August 1964.

Since 1975, Robert Mugabe, the Secretary-General of ZANU, who had also served several years in detention, has come to be regarded as the leader of the party by the majority of its membership, in place of Rev. Sithole. Rev. Sithole was not a party to the formation of the Patriotic Front in October 1976 (*see below*). In August 1977, Robert Mugabe was elected President of ZANU at a party congress in Mozambique.

Both ZANU and ZAPU have been officially recognised by the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations as liberation movements seeking majority rule and independence for Zimbabwe. Both movements have repeatedly stated their aim to establish a democratic state in Zimbabwe based on one person, one vote, in which everyone, irrespective of race, colour or religion shall have the right to participate, and which will work towards the realisation of socialist principles. (*Zimbabwe African National Union—Constitution; Zimbabwe African People's Union—party's ideological concept*).

## AFRICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL (ANC)

The **African National Council**, involving members of both ZAPU and ZANU, was formed in December 1971. Its aims was to organise a united campaign for the rejection of proposals for a settlement agreed in November that year between Ian Smith and the British government, represented by the Conservative Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa, who had not previously been involved in nationalist politics, was chosen as the ANC's first president. (*See below under ATTEMPTS AT A SETTLEMENT*).

The ANC successfully co-ordinated opposition to the settlement proposals despite many obstructive and repressive actions by the Smith regime, prior to and during the test of acceptability by the Pearce Commission. It continued to "strug-



gle for national emancipation from the yoke of a racist and oppressive minority rule" despite the harassment of its membership and the detention of many of its leaders during the post-Pearce period. Its *Manifesto under the banner of unity*, published in March 1972, dedicated the organization to the struggle for universal human rights and a just social and economic order in Zimbabwe.

In the summer of 1973 discussions commenced between the Smith regime and the ANC in an attempt to reach an "internal settlement". In June 1974, however, proposals put forward by Smith were unanimously rejected, and the ANC suspended all talks with the regime.

## MOVES TOWARDS UNITY

Concerted efforts have been made over the years to unite the main nationalist organizations. In March 1972, after signing a "declaration of intent to unite", ZANU and ZAPU set up a Joint Military Command, to be responsible for planning and co-ordinating the armed struggle.

In December 1974, following the release from detention of a number of leading ZANU and ZAPU members, ZAPU, ZANU, the ANC and FROLIZI signed an agreement by which they united in the re-constituted African National Council. (FROLIZI, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, was formed in exile in October 1971 by former members of ZAPU and ZANU). *The Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity* was signed in Lusaka, Zambia, on 7 December 1974 by Bishop Abel Muzorewa (ANC), Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole (ZANU), Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU) and James Chikerema (FROLIZI). It recognised the ANC as "the unifying force of the people of Zimbabwe", and agreed to unite ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI under its umbrella in preparation for any constitutional conference to transfer power to the majority that might ensue. The enlarged ANC executive also undertook to prepare for the holding of a congress within four months, to adopt a revised ANC constitution and to elect the leadership.

For various reasons, however, the Declaration of Unity was not fully realised in practice. Over the following months signs of disagreement grew within the ANC. In September 1975, Joshua Nkomo was elected President of the African National Council by a congress organised by a majority of the ANC executive in Salisbury. The ANC has since operated inside Zimbabwe as two organisations, usually referred to as the **United African National Council (UANC)** led by Bishop Muzorewa, and the **African National Council of Zimbabwe ANC(Z)**, or **ANC(ZAPU)**, led by Joshua Nkomo.

## THE PATRIOTIC FRONT

Efforts to unite ZAPU and ZANU continued meanwhile. In November 1975 the military wings of the two liberation movements (the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army, ZPRA, and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, ZANLA, respectively), were combined to form the Zimbabwe People's Army,



ZIPA, and an 18-person Military High Command was set up. While the immediate aim was to step up and consolidate the armed struggle, the move was also intended to avoid a situation in which two separate armies existed after independence.

A year later, military unification was followed by the formation, on 8 October 1976, of the **Patriotic Front** as a tactical alliance between ZAPU and ZANU. The two organizations, led by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, announced their intention to send a joint delegation to the forthcoming Geneva constitutional talks. While ZANU and ZAPU initially each retained its separate identity and independence, the decision was made to merge into a single political and military front. Further steps towards unity were agreed at a meeting in Maputo from 15-17 January 1977 and a 10-member Co-ordinating Committee was set up.

The objectives of the Patriotic Front are, once the white minority regime has been overthrown, to create a free and democratic state in which all may enjoy peace, security, equal rights and happiness, and to establish a socio-economic order that will eliminate exploitation of man by man.

The Patriotic Front has won the support of many African countries. On 9 January 1977, at the close of a two-day summit meeting in Lusaka, the five front-line states of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia resolved to give the Front their "full political, moral and diplomatic support". Six months later, on 5 July, the 49 member states of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in Libreville, Gabon, endorsed this decision and called on all Zimbabweans involved in the liberation struggle to join the Patriotic Front. (*The Times* 6.7.77).



## V The Denial of Rights and Freedoms

### REPRESSIVE LAWS

An enormous body of repressive legislation has been built up in Zimbabwe over the years in the name of preserving "law and order" and national security.

Such laws, while in many cases couched in non-racial terms, are intended to suppress opposition to the system of white minority rule and in practice are used almost exclusively against black people. Policemen, soldiers, civil servants and other employees of the regime have very wide powers to harass, break up and ban political meetings and organizations, arrest and detain people without charge, suppress the publication of critical opinions or comments, control individual freedom of movement, and generally to take any other form of action considered necessary to maintain the status quo without fear of legal redress.

Many of the discriminatory and repressive laws currently on the Smith regime's statute book were in fact first introduced well before UDI, at a time when the British government retained a right of veto over the settlers' proposals. The *Law and Order (Maintenance) Act*, for example, was brought into force in 1960. This wide-ranging act has since that time been the cornerstone of the white minority's security legislation and the main legal weapon against the armed liberation struggle. It has been amended and strengthened many times. The *Unlawful Organizations Act*, used to ban all successive African nationalist parties, was introduced in 1959, while the *African Affairs Act*, used to ban all political meetings in the Tribal Trust Lands and to punish and depose African chiefs who resist official policies of the regime, dates from as far back as 1928.

### THE STATE OF EMERGENCY

On 5 November 1965, just six days before UDI, a nationwide State of Emergency was declared in Zimbabwe by the then Governor of Rhodesia. It has been in force continuously ever since. (Similar states of emergency were enforced on previous occasions but had always been lifted after periods of three months).

Under the terms of the *Emergency Powers Act* of 1960, a whole series of Emergency Powers Regulations have been drafted by the regime to supplement and strengthen existing laws. They control many features of life under white minority rule, including security, labour, the economy and trade. Many of the basic rights and freedoms supposedly guaranteed under the regime's republican constitution have been effectively suspended as more and more stringent emergency measures have been enforced. Important examples of the Emergency Powers Regulations are:-

*The Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations* which provide powers to arrest and detain people without charge; for the forcible removal



of populations and the setting-up of protected villages; the destruction of property, clearance of vegetation and the designation of curfew areas and free-fire zones; forced labour and the confiscation of crops and livestock; etc.

The *Emergency Powers (Control of Manpower) Regulations* which control the activities of employees in certain industries.

The *Emergency Powers (Prohibition of Foreign Aid to Designated Political Parties) Regulations* which were introduced to prevent funds being provided to the African National Council from abroad.

The *Emergency Powers (Sanctions Counter-Espionage) Regulations* which exist to prevent anyone disclosing information about sanctions breaking.

## IDENTIFICATION AND THE PASS LAWS

As in South Africa, 'pass laws' are enforced by the Smith regime to control the supply of African labour to white farming and industrial areas, and as a security measure. They have been progressively tightened up since a period of relaxation at the time of the Central African Federation.

All African males in Zimbabwe over the age of 16 are required under the African (Registration and Identification) Act to carry a registration certificate complete with photograph and finger-prints at all times. (The only exemptions made have been for Africans living legally in certain Tribal Trust Lands within the recognized area of their own village). In certain areas the age limit is reduced to 12. The penalty for contravening the pass laws is a fine of up to Rh \$100, up to six months' imprisonment, or both.

There are other laws restricting freedom of movement: under the Vagrancy Act, Africans classified as "vagrants" can be prohibited from entering urban areas; their certificates are endorsed with particulars of their banning order. A "vagrant" includes anyone in an urban area who is not lawfully resident or employed there. Wha Wha, outside Gwelo, today the regime's main prison camp for political detainees, was once used to accommodate vagrants and unemployed people picked up by the police. Unemployed Africans are only allowed a limited period in which to seek work and risk prosecution under the pass laws if they move around too widely in the search.

Under the National Registration Act, which came into force in the second half of 1976, the regime is planning to introduce identity cards for everyone—white, Asian, Coloured and African—over the age of 16. Information about the entire adult population, male and female, will ultimately be stored under top security in a centralised computer system. Registration, which is expected to take about five years overall, got under way in January 1977 in the Makoni district.

## FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

It is very difficult for opponents of the system of white minority rule in Zimbabwe to legally organise political meetings or demonstrations.

Under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, public meetings, defined as any



group of 12 or more people, can only be held if a permit is obtained 14 days in advance from the relevant local authority or the police. The organisers have to submit all the details, including the agenda and list of speakers, and must lay on facilities for the police to tape-record the proceedings.

Even after permits have been issued, the authorities may step in with a ban or lay down all kinds of restrictions. During the period of the 1976 Geneva Conference, for example, a number of open-air "press conferences" were arranged for Bishop Muzorewa, Joshua Nkomo, or their deputies, to report back to their followers. Despite huge crowds, no amplification was permitted, or questions from the audience, and speakers were warned that their addresses must not be political in content.

Meetings organised by Africans are never permitted in "white" areas and are prohibited completely in the Tribal Trust Lands. Other restraints include a total ban on Sunday or evening meetings.

Under Section 17 of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, a policeman can enter a private house and break up a private discussion involving as few as three people if he has "reasonable grounds" for believing that one of them is going to make a "seditious or subversive statement".

## THE BANNING OF ORGANISATIONS

Successive African nationalist organizations have been banned whenever they appeared to be developing into a serious threat to white minority rule. Since World War II the main bans have been as follows:

- **African National Congress of Southern Rhodesia**  
formed 12 September 1957; banned 25 February 1959
- **National Democratic Party**  
Formed 1 January 1960; banned 9 December 1961
- **Zimbabwe African People's Union**  
Formed 17 December 1961; banned 19 September 1962
- **Zimbabwe African National Union**  
Formed 8 August 1963; banned 26 August 1964
- **People's Caretaker Council**  
Formed 10 August 1963; banned 26 August 1964

Despite being forced underground, members of the nationalist movement have continued to work, mobilising African opinion in very difficult and restrictive conditions.

Under the Unlawful Organizations Act, a number of other bodies such as the Zimbabwe African Congress of Unions and the Cold Comfort Farm Society, a multiracial cooperative agricultural scheme, have also been banned.

The African National Council, although never formally proscribed by the regime, has been subjected to continual harassment. Many of its members and officials at all levels have been detained or sentenced to prison terms for political



offences. In 1972, the regime banned the issue of ANC membership cards, and in May 1976, the issue of receipt cards for donations—a tactic devised by the ANC to get around the problem of the first ban—was also proscribed. It has since been impossible for either the United African National Council or the African National Council of Zimbabwe (*see above*) to service their members in the normal way.

In April 1977, the issue of receipts or any other form of membership document by the People's Movement, an organization of ZANU supporters inside Zimbabwe was banned on the orders of the regime's President.

## FREEDOM OF SPEECH

The illegal regime displays great intolerance towards anyone whom it thinks is challenging the system of minority rule via the spoken or written word.

There are many rules and regulations governing what may or may not be said. Under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, for example, anyone convicted of having "subversive material" in their possession or making a "subversive statement" is liable to up to five years' imprisonment. Such an offence might involve a song, a cartoon or a poster, as well as a speech or a book. In 1975 an American Methodist missionary was deported with his entire family after being accused of drawing a cartoon (never actually published) on the theme of protected villages. During the visit of the Pearce Commission to Zimbabwe, a number of young boys were even arrested for wearing T-shirts with the slogans "We say No to the proposals".

There are even heavier penalties for making remarks considered by the regime to be "encouraging violence" or likely to cause "alarm and despondency". Not only Africans are affected; in March 1977, members of the regime's security forces were warned that they could be liable to the death penalty or life imprisonment if found guilty under the Defence Act of endangering national security by gossiping about their exploits in war. A few months later, at the beginning of September, four leading officials of the Roman Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, all of them white, were arrested in Salisbury in connection with the Commission's plans to publish a report alleging torture and atrocities by the regime's security forces. The regime's controls on information seem designed to prevent white people from discovering what is really going on in the country as a whole; as well as to stop useful information passing into the hands of Africans.

## CONTROL OF THE PRESS AND MEDIA

Press control is a marked and increasingly restrictive feature of life under the illegal regime. Rhodesian whites have been described by a South African journalist as "arguably the most brain-washed national group in modern times". (*Sunday Times, Johannesburg* 9.5.76)

Virtually no foreign newspapers or other imported publications with any political content are still on sale inside the country, while the local press and media



are subject to the most rigorous and far-reaching controls. Radio and television are both controlled by the regime and only broadcast commentary in support of official policies.

Direct press censorship was introduced by the regime after UDI and for a time blank spaces appeared in the newspapers where the official censors had cut out various items. In April 1968, a policy of "voluntary censorship" was introduced under which all news material is submitted in advance of publication to the Ministry of Information for vetting. No information relating to security matters and the war is printed until it has been cleared by the Ministry of Defence or the military Combined Operations Headquarters, while legislation such as the 1969 Emergency Powers (Sanctions Counter-Espionage) Regulations and the Official Secrets Act prevents the disclosure of material relating to sanctions-breaking.

The Smith regime believes that it is the target of an intense "psychological war" waged by its enemies abroad. Considerable resources are devoted to producing official information sheets and other propaganda for overseas consumption, to counter the fallacies and distortions which the regime believes are spread about by anti-apartheid groups. In 1976, for example, thousands of air letter forms were distributed free for Rhodesians to send to their friends and relatives abroad. The forms carried a printed letter describing the situation inside Rhodesia as one of "internal peace, productivity, growth and racial harmony". (*Rhodesia Herald* 1.4.76). Meanwhile, in a renewed effort to suppress information relating to national security and which could cause "alarm and despondency", a National Security Committee with powers to issue "D" Notices upon local editors was set up in April 1976. No reason need be given by the Committee for imposing a "D" Notice, and it may not be challenged by any court of law. Offenders are liable to fines of up to Rh \$10,000 or five years' imprisonment, or both.

In July 1976, the regime moved to restrict the entry of foreign journalists to Zimbabwe by announcing that from then on, all visiting pressmen had to apply for residence or temporary employment permits. To become an accredited defence correspondent, in particular, a foreign journalist must take up Rhodesian residence, thereby becoming liable for conscription into the army or police after two years in the country. Correspondents are only rarely allowed into the operational areas and are kept under close supervision at all times. The result of all the restrictions is that virtually no-one outside Zimbabwe can tell how the armed struggle is developing or knows what is really going on in the war zones. (*Sunday Times, London* 26.6.77). Newspapers in Britain and other overseas countries rely heavily on information emanating from the regime, and inevitably present a one-sided view of the situation. Very few correspondents are in fact based in Salisbury; the *London Daily Telegraph*, the *Daily Mail*, the *Guardian* and the BBC, for example, were all reported in 1977 to be using material from the same journalist writing under the names of Brian Henry, Peter Norman, Henry Miller and Ian Mills respectively. In real life, their source was a reporter with the *Rhodesia Herald*. (*New Statesman* 25.2.77).



## BANNING AND CENSORSHIP

Censorship also affects other forms of publication: the printing, publication, distribution, importation, sale and possession of any publication—including gramophone records, tape recordings and newspaper cartoons as well as books and magazines—can be prohibited by the regime under the terms of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and other legislation.

A number of newspapers sympathetic to the African nationalist cause have been banned in this way. In August 1964, a Thompson Group newspaper with a mainly African readership, the *African Daily News*, was banned under Section 18 of the Act. The Catholic weekly paper *Moto* was banned in the autumn of 1974, initially for three months but later permanently. *Umbowo*, a periodical taken over from the United Methodist Church by the Christian Council of Rhodesia was banned in August 1976 and again in January 1977. In September 1975 the regime impounded and destroyed 750 copies of the Johannesburg *Sunday Times* "in the interests of public safety".

Political works may also be banned by a Censorship Board set up by the regime in December 1967 under the Censorship and Entertainments Control Act to control literature and entertainments. The Board concentrates on books and magazines and films considered to be violent or pornographic, and has declared a large number of overseas writers, including Doris Lessing, Simone de Beauvoir, James Baldwin and Jean Paul Sartre, to be undesirable or prohibited.

## DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL

Thousands of political opponents of the Smith regime have been detained without charge or trial over the years on the grounds that they pose a threat to "law and order" or national security.

Before 1965 the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act was used for this purpose, but since UDI, individuals have usually been detained under the terms of the Emergency Powers Regulations. They may be held indefinitely, and no reason need be given. Many Zimbabweans are detained immediately on completing prison sentences imposed for political offences, or on being acquitted of political charges in a court of law. In September 1976 the regime's Minister of Law and Order explained this practice to the House of Assembly by suggesting that "the fact that a person is found not guilty does not mean he has not done what he has been accused of". (*Rhodesia Herald* 4.9.76).

The number of Zimbabweans detained without charge or trial has fluctuated. At the beginning of 1975, at the height of Vorster's detente initiative, it may have dropped to about 300, but the total rose rapidly in the following year as a result of a countrywide wave of arrests of ANC members and officials.

In May 1977, at least 1,450 people were known to be detained. A few weeks later, at the beginning of July, up to 200 members and officials of the African National Council (Zimbabwe) were arrested and detained in a countrywide police



swoop. The regime has made it an offence to publish the name of any detainee, and the real total, particularly including those people who have been arrested in the war zones and held without charge in remote police or army camps, may well be very much higher.

The largest number of detainees, about 600, are held in a special prison camp at Wha Wha, outside Gwelo in the central part of the country. Wha Wha was one of the first two preventive detention camps to be set up by the regime, in 1964. Other detainees are held in special sections of regular prisons. They are allowed to undertake private study and unlike convicted prisoners, are not forced to do hard labour. However, there is no organised recreation or sport, virtually no personal possessions are allowed, and diet and medical attention are extremely poor.

Perhaps the worst aspect of detention, apart from overcrowding and physical discomfort, is the detainee's constant concern and worry for his or her family and dependants, who are often left without any means of supporting themselves.

## RESTRICTION

Under the terms of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, the regime can issue a restriction order against a person, confining him or her to a particular area, or forbidding him or her from entering others for up to 5 years.

Restriction orders have been widely used since the early sixties to curb the activities of African nationalists and to prevent leaders and organisers from making contact with their colleagues. A restrictee may be forced to live in a remote area of a Tribal Trust Land or in a protected village. A person who has previously been convicted of some minor political offence can be prohibited from organising, attending or addressing a public gathering of any kind. Many people are restricted on being released from detention, thus making it even more difficult for them to find a job and to support their families. Restricted persons, like detainees, may not be quoted or named in the press or other media.

Since 1971 no official figures have been published of the numbers of restriction orders issued, and it is impossible to say how many people are affected at any particular time. The number may well run into the hundreds.

## DEPORTATION

Many recent immigrants and visitors to white ruled Rhodesia who disagree with the policies of the Smith regime have been deported. A person may also be declared a prohibited immigrant and prevented from entering the country. At least 70 journalists have been expelled or prohibited since UDI in 1965, for example, and the powers have also been extensively used against missionaries and university lecturers. (*Sunday Times, London* 26.6.77).

Under the 1970 Citizens Act, Rhodesian citizenship can be withdrawn from persons who obtained it by registration (i.e. not by birth). The regime has been





*Racial segregation is enforced by law. Signs such as this reveal the black majority's inferior status. (Camera Press)*



*Most Rhodesian whites employ at least one servant. These African women will earn less than £5 a week.*

**COUNTRY SHOPPERS**  
now is your chance!

**MAIDS' UNIFORMS**  
with matching  
Cap or Doek, Belt and Apron  
Rhodesia's largest range of  
designs and colours.  
Floral, stripe, plain and nursery

SIZES	S	M	L
Bust:	34-35	36-38	40-42
SIZES:	XOS	XXOS	
Bust:	44	46-48	

From \$5.99 Set

All 'Melitta' uniforms are fully  
guaranteed for quality and wash-  
ability.

*Melitta*

55  
MANICA ROAD  
(near Kingsway)

Phone  
26964

17014-X-30



*Advertisement in a Rhodesian newspaper.*





*Women employees on a white-owned tobacco farm. Most Africans with paid jobs work as unskilled manual labourers.*

**SALISBURY UNITED OMNIBUS  
COMPANY LIMITED**

**Dismissal of Striking  
Employees**

'All employees of the Salisbury United Omnibus Company Limited at present on strike have been dismissed, effective from today, in terms of the Transport Operating Industry Employment Regulations.

Consideration will be given to engaging former employees, and others, who report at the Depot from Monday, 3rd January, 1977.

**P. A. HORNBLOW,**  
General Manager.

31st December, 1976.

15289-SM-3/67234-Y-2

*Official announcement in a Rhodesian newspaper after an attempted strike by African bus drivers and conductors.*





*A detention camp for Africans who have opposed white minority rule.*



*A political trial under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. These men have been accused of assisting guerillas.*





## NOTICE

To the people of:

MAKWE tribal trust land  
 GULATI tribal trust land  
 MATSHETSHE tribal trust land  
 WENLOCK tribal trust land  
 INSIZA tribal trust land  
 GWATEMBA purchase land  
 GLASSBLOCK tribal trust land  
 MALOLE tribal trust land

As from 6 p.m. on the 22nd August, 1977 until further notice, there is a curfew in these areas.

From that day, no person other than a member of the Security Forces may be outside a kraal between sunset and sunrise.

Also from that day, no vehicles may be out after dark except vehicles travelling from Pangani Mine to Croft Mine.

If you are found more than 50 metres from a house after sunset, you may be shot.

## ISAZISO

Kubantu abahlala kulezi indawo:

MAKWE tribal trust land  
 GULATI tribal trust land  
 MATSHETSHE tribal trust land  
 WENLOCK tribal trust land  
 INSIZA tribal trust land  
 GWATEMBA purchase land  
 GLASSBLOCK tribal trust land  
 MALOLE tribal trust land

Kusukela ngo 6 p.m. mhlaka 22nd August lizelaziswe njalo akusavunyelwa ukuhamba hamba kulezi izindawo.

Kusukela ngalelo langa akulamuntu ngaphandle kwamabutho okuvikela ongaba ngaphandle komuzi kusukela ekutshoneni kusiya ekuphumeni kwelanga.

Kusukela kulelo langa akula zimota ezingahamba ngephandle kwe zimota ezivela e Pangani zisiya e Croft Mine.

Ungaficakala uyi 50 metres kusukela endlini yakho ungadutshulwa.

by order of  
 The Protecting Authority  
 Matabeleland Province

*A curfew notice distributed in the operational areas.*



*Zimbabwean refugee camp at Doroi in Mozambique. (UNHCR)*





*Women being searched at a protected village.*



*The protected villages, or fenced camps, are guarded day and night by armed troops.*





*Members of the regime's Grey's Scouts or mounted infantry. (Camera Press)*



*African regular troops with a Hippo, an armoured vehicle developed by the regime to withstand land-mine explosions. (Camera Press)*

Security  
S1130177

## DEFEND YOURSELF WITH THE LDP SEMI-AUTOMATIC PISTOL

The manufacturers wish to advise potential customers  
that there will be a live demonstration at  
**CLEVELAND RANGE, 12 noon, Saturday, 5th February**

67299-Y-30

*Advertisement directed at white readers  
in a Rhodesian newspaper.*





*A train derailed by guerilla action on the Rutenga-Beitbridge line linking Rhodesia with South Africa. (Associated Press)*




*Guerillas of the liberation movement with weapons captured from the security forces.*





*A Rhodesian boy thanks the South African government for supplying petrol and oil to the regime in the months following UDI.*





able to deport some of its own citizens on the strength of these powers—the best known recent example being the Roman Catholic Bishop of Umtali, Donal Lamont. Bishop Lamont, who became a Rhodesian citizen in 1950, was deported in March 1977 (*see also under POLITICAL TRIALS*).

## **POLITICAL PRISONERS**

At the end of July 1977, there were over 1,000 convicted political prisoners in Zimbabwe, the vast majority serving sentences under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act for offences connected with their support of the nationalist movement. Some have been consigned to gaol for life.

Some of those now in prison are guerilla fighters who have been captured by the security forces, or people accused of possessing arms and ammunition. Others are alleged to have helped the guerillas by giving them food and shelter, concealing their presence from the authorities, or encouraging “recruits” to join the armed struggle. They include many ordinary village residents of the war zones as well as officials of the nationalist movement. Since the beginning of 1976 many teenagers, both boys and girls and some as young as 13 or 14, have been sent to prison after being arrested while trying to escape across the border, allegedly to join the guerillas.

Apart from the armed struggle many Zimbabweans have been convicted of “crimes” which elsewhere would be regarded as part of normal political activity. The African Affairs Act, for example, is frequently invoked against people accused of taking part in “illegal meetings.”

The largest number of political prisoners are held at Khami Maximum Security Prison outside Bulawayo. Political prisoners are subject to even more rigid security than ordinary offenders and have virtually no contact with the outside world. A number are known to have died from illnesses brought on by the harsh conditions—inadequate food, forced labour and lack of medical facilities.

Prisoners are graded according to race and type of offence, with African political prisoners at the bottom of the scale. The regime has consistently refused permission to the International Red Cross to visit Khami prison and does not even allow prisoners to study.

Very few white people have ever been sent to prison on political grounds by the regime. Bishop Donal Lamont, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Umtali, was deported in March 1977 instead of being made to serve a prison sentence (his original 10 year sentence was cut on appeal to one year) for failing to report guerillas. John Conradie, a South African, is serving a 20 year term in Salisbury Maximum Security Prison after being convicted in 1967 of involvement in guerilla recruiting and training. Father Paul Egli, a Swiss Roman Catholic priest sentenced to 5 years imprisonment in January 1977 for failing to report guerillas, had his sentence cut on appeal to one year in April. Other white missionaries have been given suspended sentences.



## **POLITICAL TRIALS**

Political trials of Africans in Zimbabwe take place before a judge or magistrate and assessors, all of whom are white. There is no provision for a jury and the proceedings are conducted entirely in English, using translators where necessary. Many defendants of course, especially those from rural areas, are unlikely to fully understand English. Many trials, particularly those where the evidence is thought to bear on national security, are conducted wholly or partly in secret, with all press and public excluded.

In May 1976, the regime introduced a new type of court specifically to deal with captured guerilla fighters and villagers accused of helping them. The numbers arrested and charged with these kinds of offences had become so great that the conventional courts were unable to cope. The new "Special Courts" are also intended as a warning to local people; under the regulations governing them, trials can be convened in any place selected by the regime such as before an audience of local people in a remote village in the war zone.

The Special Courts are empowered to impose the same range of punishments as the High Court, despite the fact that the Court President is only required to have the same legal qualifications as a magistrate, advocate or attorney, while the other members who sit with him need have none at all. The regulations governing the Special Courts make it very difficult for adequate legal defence to be arranged for the person on trial and in general put him or her at a grave disadvantage. The defendant's normal right to be represented by an advocate or attorney of his or her own choice can be overruled by the Court President if it is considered that bringing a defence counsel to the court would result in "undue delay." If the accused refuses to answer any question, or is found to have withheld certain information from the police after being arrested, the court may draw an adverse inference and treat the accused's behaviour as incriminating evidence. Trials can be held at short notice and may be over very quickly; over the first seven months of the Special Court's operation, over 100 people were known to have been convicted by them under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. Nearly a quarter of these—24—were sentenced to death.

## **LIBERATION AND THE RULES OF WAR**

Under new Geneva Conventions adopted in June 1977, the international laws of war are to be extended to cover the armed liberation struggles being fought in Southern Africa. Guerillas who distinguish themselves from non-combatants by carrying their weapons openly are to accorded full prisoner-of-war status.

There is little likelihood of the Smith regime paying any attention to this new international agreement. Its spokesmen have always maintained that Africans who take up arms to free their country are traitors and criminals who do not deserve to be treated as normal human beings. In May 1976 the regime's



Secretary for Internal Affairs told a passing-out parade of police recruits that whereas "normal criminals" were still entitled to the protection of the law, "the terrorist, because of his conduct, may be shot on sight." (*Rhodesia Herald* 15.5.76).

Many captured guerilla fighters do eventually appear before Rhodesian courts, but the bodies of others who have been killed in the war zones are put on display by the security forces to frighten local villagers. The regime has even outlawed the use of the words "guerilla" and "freedom fighter" as a treasonable offence.

## ILLEGAL EXECUTIONS

At least 130 people have been executed on political charges by the illegal regime since 1968; most have been hanged in secret.

Under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, a Zimbabwean may be sentenced to death for any of the following reasons:-

- undergoing a course of guerilla training
- recruiting or encouraging another person to go for guerilla training
- being in possession of weapons of war
- arson, sabotage, bomb attacks, laying landmines and other acts of guerilla warfare
- providing food, shelter and other forms of assistance to guerillas
- failing to report the presence of guerillas to the authorities within a specified time.

All but two of these "hanging clauses" were introduced by the regime following UDI. In addition, the death penalty may be imposed for crimes such as murder and rape.

In March 1968, the regime executed five captured guerilla fighters in defiance of a British royal reprieve. These executions, and the many others that have followed, are illegal under both British and international law. Between 1968 and April 1975, at least 60 Zimbabweans are known to have been hanged, many of them in a wave of executions from May 1973 onwards.

On 21 April 1975, the regime announced that from then on it no longer considered it necessary to announce when people had been executed or to reveal their names, and was immediately ceasing to do so on the grounds that hangings were an "emotive" issue. Hangings are now carried out in secret in Salisbury prison, and even, it is believed, in the middle of the night. Families and relatives are not notified of the death of a condemned man either before or afterwards, and are not permitted to remove the body for burial.

The numbers executed are rising dramatically: between April 1975 and September 1977, a total of at least 136 people are known to have been sentenced to death by the regime, 109 of them on charges under the Law and Order



(Maintenance) Act or on other charges connected with their support for the armed struggle. Appeals against the death sentence are known to have been successful in only 6 cases out of the 109, and it is highly probable that the vast majority have been executed.

The Rhodesian judiciary have become more and more disposed to using the death penalty not only against captured guerilla fighters but also against officials and members of the nationalist organisations, on charges of supporting and recruiting for the armed struggle. The situation has not, however, attracted much international attention, nor in particular, public protests from the British Government. There has been no further attempt to exercise the British royal reprieve to save the lives of those under sentence of death, although the British Government did suggest in July 1977 that its use could once again be considered. (*Hansard* 28.7.77, col. 1071).



## VI The Armed Struggle

### GUERRILLA ACTIVITY

Guerilla units of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) began operating inside Zimbabwe around the time of UDI. Both liberation movements had decided that the Smith regime's suppression of all efforts to achieve peaceful change made armed struggle inevitable.

Guerilla attacks in the north and east of the country continued until mid-1967 when joint units of ZAPU and the African National Congress of South Africa launched a major campaign in the Wankie area which lasted for several months. The Smith regime reacted to the attacks by calling in South African assistance. Paramilitary units of the South African Police had moved into Rhodesia by August 1967.

Both ZAPU and ZANU mounted extensive campaigns during the early 70s to politicise and win the support of local people. Guerilla activity built up to a new level of effectiveness from mid-1972, with sustained actions throughout the north and north-east of the country.

In November 1975, the military wings of ZAPU and ZANU (the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), respectively) combined to form the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). The move was reflected in a rapid upsurge of guerilla activity from January 1976 onwards, an offensive that has continued broadly unchecked. Military unification was followed in October 1976 by the formation of the Patriotic Front as a political alliance. (*See also under THE PATRIOTIC FRONT*).

### DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR

Because of the tight control exercised by the regime over information from the operational areas, it is extremely difficult to build up an overall picture of the development of the guerilla war. One thing is certain—that guerilla activity has been on a far wider scale than is officially admitted.

Contrary to the impression cultivated by the regime's military officers, the guerillas have attacked carefully selected targets according to a definite strategy. Communiques from the security forces report only a selection of incidents in the war zones—quite a different picture is presented by, for example, the evidence of political trials. Meetings at which guerillas have explained their aims to local people and called for support have been described in court by African witnesses and defendants. Guerillas live among local people both in the rural



areas and the African townships of cities such as Bulawayo. They are sheltered and fed by local people despite the heavy penalties for this under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and at the hands of the Rhodesian security forces. It is evident that in some parts of the country, the regime is no longer in effective control and the guerillas move around freely.

Apart from attacks on the security forces themselves, the tactics of the guerilla fighters have been directed at disrupting the white-owned economy as far as possible. Repeated attacks have been made on the regime's crucial road and rail links, particularly with South Africa and Botswana. Work on tea estates and farms in the eastern part of the country has been brought almost to a standstill in many cases by attacks on plant and machinery, and campaigns of landmining and bush burning along the roads used to transport the African labour force. The work of local African Councils set up by the regime has been disrupted, tax collection has been brought to a halt, and schools have been closed.

In August 1977, a District Commissioner in the Honde Valley in the eastern part of Zimbabwe admitted that earlier that year, "the entire economy of the valley had virtually collapsed, and we had lost the ability to be able to administer or govern. The terrorist (the regime's word for guerillas) was in a situation where he was carrying out administration of his own type. All the schools had closed, and constantly members of the security forces were reacting instead of acting to the situation". (*BBC Monitoring Service* 3.8.77).

The combination of guerilla activity, large scale conscription of whites into the armed forces, spiralling defence costs and hold-ups in road and rail transportation, has had serious consequences for the white economy. Many white-owned farms have been abandoned, while in July 1977, for example, the giant South African mining group, Anglo-American Corporation, announced that it had decided to recall all its prospecting staff from Zimbabwe and curtail exploration work, because of the security situation. (*Financial Times* 25.7.77).

## THE RESPONSE OF THE REGIME

The Smith regime has been compelled to mount and sustain a large and ever-growing operation to contain the guerilla activity.

Many new and harsh measures have been introduced under the Emergency Regulations to ensure that the security forces retain control over the countryside and to frighten local people into supporting the regime. They include:

- the creation of "no go" areas and forced removal of thousands of Africans into protected and consolidated villages;
- the construction of a security network of roads and communications using forced labour;
- the closure of schools, missions, community centres, hospitals, businesses etc., the destruction and confiscation of crops, livestock and property;
- the imposition of collective fines and other punishments upon villages suspected of assisting guerillas.



Spokesmen for the regime have made it clear that the security forces are fully prepared to embark upon a full-scale scorched earth policy to prevent Zimbabwe falling into the hands of the liberation movement. In September 1977 however, despite all these arrangements, they admitted that an estimated 3,600 nationalist guerillas were operating inside the country. (*Financial Times* 19.9.77).

## PROTECTED VILLAGES

The regime soon became aware that persuasion, threats, and heavy penalties under the law would not prevent the residents of the operational areas from helping the guerillas. The protected village strategy, under which thousands of villagers have been forcibly removed from their homes into fenced camps, often long distances away, is intended to cut the guerillas off from food, shelter and all other contact with local people.

The first protected villages or "cages", as they are called by those forced to live in them, were set up in the remote Zambezi Valley in the extreme north-east of the country. 8,000 people had been moved into small corrugated iron shelters in fenced-in areas by the end of 1973, their villages destroyed, and a broad strip of land adjoining the border declared a no-go area and defoliated. The programme got fully under way the following year when the residents of Tribal Trust Lands such as Chiweshe, only 40 miles north-east of Salisbury, were resettled.

According to the regime, 250,000 people have been affected. In June 1977, the Minister of Internal Affairs revealed that 145 protected and 40 consolidated villages had been completed, and that another 32 protected villages would come into operation by the end of the year. Other sources put the figures much higher; the Roman Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace stated in August 1977 that there were now 203 protected villages and that an estimated 580,000 people had been compulsorily removed. Protected villages have been set up along the entire length of the Mozambique border from the north east region down to the south, and probably in the northwest of Zimbabwe as well. (*A. K. H. Weinrich: Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia, Journal of Southern African Studies Vol.3 No.2 April 1977; International Committee of the Red Cross report on activities in Southern Africa, 14.2.77; BBC Monitoring Service 14.6.77; Observer 4.9.77*).

Each protected village, or "keep" (as they are also called by the regime) is surrounded by a high chain-link security fence topped with barbed wire, and floodlights on poles facing outwards to light up the surrounding area. The camps, some of which are several hundred acres in extent, others much smaller, are guarded by armed security force personnel (Internal Affairs, Guard Force or regular army). The troops are based in a barracks on an earthen sandbagged "fort" in the centre of the camp—so that the ordinary residents are between them and any outside attack. Consolidated villages, first set up in early 1975, are intended by the regime as a second line of defence in areas of less intense guerilla activity. They involve the same mass population removals, but are not fenced.



Conditions inside the camps are harsh. Once the people have been transported to the site of a protected village by the security forces, they have to build shelters for themselves from poles, grass and whatever else is available. Their old homes may have been burnt down or destroyed by the troops to prevent the guerillas making use of them. The people live crowded together, sanitary arrangements are often almost totally lacking, food rationed and of poor quality. Curfews are strictly enforced, and residents are allowed out only at specified times to care for their livestock or cultivate the fields.

The humiliation and discomfort of life in the fenced camps is bitterly resented. Meetings have been organised by the guerillas, urging people to resist further attempts to evict them from their homes and remove them "behind the wire". Many protected and consolidated villages have been attacked and partially destroyed by guerilla groups, who often manage to slip through the fences to contact the people inside.

### **CURFEWS AND NO-GO AREAS**

Curfews were declared in certain Tribal Trust Lands and African Purchase Areas in the north-east of Zimbabwe in June 1974, under the Emergency Powers Regulations. A year later, in July and August 1975, they were extended along virtually the entire length of Zimbabwe's border with Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia. Dusk to dawn curfews now cover large areas of countryside inside Zimbabwe as well, particularly in the African areas, and have also been imposed on certain missions and schools.

Between 6 pm in the evening and 5 or 6 am in the morning no person in a curfew area may move more than 50 metres away from his or her house or venture into any street or public place. The penalty laid down under the Emergency Regulations is a prison term of up to 2 years or a fine of up to R\$200. In practice, however, curfew breakers are shot on sight by the security forces.

In some places curfews have been extended until much later in the morning, well after the normal time for starting work. Certain areas, particularly adjoining the border, have been declared as no-go areas within which any unauthorised person is likely to be taken for a guerilla and shot on sight, regardless of the time of day or night. Sections of the border, particularly with Mozambique, are protected by two rows of high security fencing, the space between being extensively landmined, and adjoining strips of country have been defoliated. Many people have been killed while attempting to cross the borders into neighbouring African countries.

Up until the beginning of 1976, the regime announced the deaths of people described as curfew-breakers with "regret". This practice has now been dropped. It is impossible to say exactly how many people have been shot dead or wounded by Rhodesian troops for breaking the curfew—perhaps because the victims made



a mistake about the time or got held up. In February 1977, Ian Smith told the Rhodesian House of Assembly that since December 1972, 632 African civilians had been killed and 294 wounded "while breaking the curfew or running with and assisting terrorists". (*Debates* 23.2.77).

## PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

The regime has devised many methods for what it describes as "winning the hearts and minds" of the African people. In fact, most of them rely on fear, threats and intimidation to enforce loyalty to the regime.

The bodies of Africans killed by the security forces are often put on public display in villages and schools. Simulated battles are mounted before audiences of local people to show off the power of the army and airforce. Leaflets with photographs of atrocities said to have been committed by guerillas are distributed in the Tribal Trust Lands, while special military teams tour the schools to warn children of the penalties for joining or supporting the armed struggle. Former guerillas who are supposed to have seen the error of their ways after being captured by the security forces are also used for this purpose. (*Debates* 23.2.77; *Rhodesia Herald* 14.5.76).

In February 1977, the regime announced that a new post of Director of Psychological Warfare had been set up in the department of the Prime Minister. In an interview shortly after being appointed to this position, Major-General Andrew Rawlins revealed that the Psychological Warfare department was also working overseas to counter groups opposed to the Smith regime in other countries. (*Sunday Mail, Salisbury* 20.3.77).

## INDEMNITY AND COMPENSATION ACT

In October 1975, the security forces and other employees of the regime gained legal protection against the consequences of any of their actions. Under the Indemnity and Compensation Act of 1975, the Rhodesian President is empowered to block all civil or criminal proceedings brought against a soldier, policeman or civil servant for any act done "in good faith" in the course of suppressing "terrorism". The Act is retrospective to 1 December 1972.

In effect, this means that any person who has suffered loss, injury, the death of a relative or damage to property at the hands of the security forces has no means of redress. Shortly after the Act's introduction, it was used to halt civil proceedings started early in 1975 against Chief Jeremiah Chirau, President of the Council of Chiefs and later the President of ZUPO (*see above under POLITICAL PARTIES*). Two brothers living under Chief Chirau's jurisdiction had been interrogated and assaulted by the Chief in person regarding their positions in



the African National Council. The Chief, as an official appointed and paid by the regime, invoked the Indemnity and Compensation Act to block a claim for damages by the two men. (*Rand Daily Mail* 17.12.75).

The Indemnity and Compensation Act has been widely criticised by, among others, the International Commission of Jurists and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia. It amounts to a *carte blanche* for the security forces to torture, commit atrocities and use other strong arm tactics without fear of legal proceedings.

In July 1977, the regime's Minister of Law and Order, Hilary Squires, told white Rhodesian farmers that they too were free to murder African intruders or others whom they suspected of attacking farm property or stealing livestock. Under the terms of the Emergency Powers Act, he said, farmers and their employees would not face prosecution if they killed anyone in the course of defending themselves or their property. (*The Times, Daily Telegraph* 28.7.77).

## THE DEFENCE BUDGET

Fighting a guerilla war has become a serious strain on the Smith regime's resources. The money poured into national security has increased dramatically over the years.


Over the financial year to 30 June 1978, the regime planned to spend around one third of its total national budget (i.e. including both budget and financing accounts) on the armed forces, the police and other security measures. The defence vote for the year (i.e. army and airforce) amounted to R\$141.8 million (compared with R\$98.4 million in 1976-7) and the police vote to R\$55.6 million (R\$47.5 million in 1976-7).

Several other departments and ministries besides the police and the armed forces contribute to the national security drive; the Ministry of Internal Affairs, for example, is responsible for setting up protected villages and running civil defence schemes; the Ministry of Roads oversees special works in the operational areas such as laying down all-weather tarred roads as a precaution against land mines; and the Ministry of Coordination is responsible for supervising the military call-up. Extra money is also allocated to the Prime Minister's office to cover the running costs of the army's Selous Scouts and the Rhodesian police force's Special Branch II, both of which come under Ian Smith's direct control.

Other costs directly attributable to the war include the regime's commitments to commerce and industry to supplement the pay of employees called up for military service, and the rerouting of imports and exports following the Mozambique government's closure of its border with Zimbabwe in March 1976.

Overall, the Smith regime is now spending well over £½ million a day on fighting the war.







## CONSCRIPTION AND CALL-UP

All white, Asian and Coloured men in Zimbabwe are liable to some form of military service under the stringent conscription requirements that have been introduced by the regime.

Within 30 days of celebrating his sixteenth birthday, every non-African boy is required to register for national service and from then until the age of 38 is only allowed to leave the country with special permission from the authorities or after completing an official "entry-exit" card. The authorities have made it increasingly more difficult to escape the call-up net, which affects the different age-groups as follows:-

- 18-25 year olds—18 months full-time national service, followed by a further three years of "efficient part-time service" as territorials, being called up for periods of several months at a time in theory, and in practice, virtually continuously.

- 25-38 year olds—a "six-weeks on, six weeks off" system was introduced in January 1977 under which men in this age group spend a total of at least six months of the year on active service, chiefly in the army.

- 38-50 year olds—conscription was introduced for men in this age range with effect from June 1977, with postings to "protective duties" with the police or in protected villages for up to 10 weeks a year.

- Over 50s—no compulsory commitment, but many white men, some well into their 60s and even 70s serve as part-time reserves in the police force as home guards, on convoy duty and so on.

Exemptions and deferments of military service are only granted in the most exceptional circumstances and for a maximum of 90 days per man per year. Conscientious objectors who ignore their call-up papers are sentenced to prison terms of several months and are conscripted on release. Under new Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations published in June 1977, conscripts who have instituted court proceedings challenging their call-ups are still obliged to join the army while their cases are being heard. It is an offence to suggest to anyone that for religious reasons or otherwise, he should not perform national service. Under the National Services Act of 1976, certain categories of person who in the past were exempt from military service, such as civil servants, MPs, judges, priests and male nurses, were made liable to conscription.

The gradual extension of the call-up to more and more categories of people, and for longer periods of time, has developed into a major point of friction between the regime and the business community. The 38-50 age group in particular, containing the most senior business executives, has played a key role in fighting the white minority's "sanctions war" against the rest of the world. In February 1977, criticism of the regime's decision to extend conscription to this age group—meaning that key men in industry might end up doing menial tasks in the lower ranks of the armed forces—was one of the factors behind the resignation of the Minister of Defence and Co-ordination, Reginald Cowper.



He was not replaced directly, and a new Ministry of Manpower, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs was set up under which responsibility for the call-up was separated from control of the war itself and grouped with responsibility for commerce and industry.

The call-up has undoubtedly been the last straw for many whites. Families have chosen to emigrate rather than see their sons killed, or their husbands' business careers broken up by constant interruptions and absences. Many young men due for conscription, particularly Asians and Coloureds, have managed to leave the country and have sought asylum abroad.

## THE SECURITY FORCES

Men who are called up by the regime are allocated to one of six main groups within the security forces—the army, airforce, police, Guard Force, Internal Affairs and the prisons service. As the war has escalated the army has claimed priority in the deployment of conscripts.

Information relating to the size, strength and equipment of the various units is kept a closely guarded secret by the regime. Overall, the security forces have a potential strength of upwards of 100,000 men, although not all of these are mobilised at any one time.

## THE RHODESIAN ARMY

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the strength of the Smith regime's regular army in 1977-8 was 5,000 men and women, plus 3,250 conscripts. (*The Military Balance* 1977-8).

There are five main fighting units:

- **Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI)**—comprises a single battalion of around 1,000 regulars, all of whom are white. The RLI prides itself on being one of the most effective counter-insurgency units in the world.

- **Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR)**—an all-African regiment staffed by white officers and with an overall strength of around 2,400 men. A second RAR battalion was established in 1975 and a third was started in the following year. The first black soldiers to become army officers were commissioned as lieutenants in June 1977. (*The Times* 10.6.77).

- **Special Air Service (SAS)**—an elite, highly-trained, all-white unit with close links with its British counterpart. The size of the unit (like that of other sections of the security forces) is treated as classified information by the regime but has been estimated as around 300 men. (*Financial Times* 26.1.77; *Guardian* 6.3.76; *Sunday Mail, Salisbury* 5.12.76).

- **Selous Scouts**—an elite tracker unit formed in February 1973 to assist the army in "seek and destroy" missions against guerilla units. The unit includes both black and white troops, who undergo rigorous training. It is believed to number around 1,000 men. Small groups of Scouts go off into the bush for six-week stretches, during which they have to be entirely self-sufficient. It is widely



believed, both inside Zimbabwe and elsewhere, that the Scouts regularly disguise themselves as freedom fighters to test out the loyalty of local African villagers, and that they are responsible for many atrocities which are subsequently claimed by the regime as the work of the liberation movement. Many such allegations have appeared in the overseas press and media. In July 1977, for example, the World Council of Churches stated on the basis of extensive interviews with deserters from the Rhodesian army that "the Scouts' record remains ugly and ominous". According to the deserters' testimonies, the Selous Scouts had murdered African villagers and arranged for the imprisonment of hundreds more in "containment camps". The Scouts claim to have the highest "kill rate" of any army unit and openly boast about their raids into neighbouring Mozambique and Botswana. (*Financial Times* 26.1.77; "One World", monthly magazine of the World Council of Churches, No. 28 July/August 1977).

● **Grey's Scouts**—a mounted infantry unit set up in July 1975 and reported at the end of 1976 to number around 200 men, a third of whom were black. The Grey's Scouts use horses for speed and endurance in tracking guerillas and like the Selous Scouts, are known to have been involved in "hot pursuit" raids into Mozambique and Botswana. (*Daily Telegraph* 13.12.76).

Other fighting units within the regular army include the **Rhodesian Artillery** (formed into a regular troop in October 1976), the **Engineers Corps** (specialists in mine warfare) and the **Military Police** (increasingly deployed in the front line as the war has escalated, in addition to their normal functions of crime detection and vice control in the ranks).

Women were first recruited as volunteers into Rhodesia's regular army and airforce in 1975. Of the first 2,000 applications, only two came from Africans. Women regulars are trained to take over clerical and administrative jobs behind the lines to release more men for active service, but they are all taught to use firearms and counter-insurgency techniques. In March 1977 there were about 280 members of the **Rhodesia Women's Service**. (*BBC Monitoring Service* 15.3.77).

Apart from regulars and national servicemen, up to 15,000 members of the territorial army are called up for active service at any one time. Most territorials serve in the **Rhodesia Regiment** (the equivalent of South Africa's Citizen Force). The territorial force has been expanded to 55,000 men, consisting of eight battalions plus support units. Men in the 38 and over age group serve in the **Reserve Holding Unit** or "Dad's Army", potential strength around 3,000. (*The Military Balance* 1977-8).

## THE AIRFORCE

Possession of an airforce, albeit outdated, has enabled the Smith regime to mount devastating bombing raids upon towns and villages in Mozambique, as well as targets inside Zimbabwe. Napalm bombs have been used in these attacks since at least 1976, according to Mozambique reports.



Various methods have been devised by the 1,300 strong regular Air Force to equip its fleet of Canberra bombers, Hawker Hunters and Vampires, dating back to pre-UDI days, for bush warfare. Air-to-ground rockets are reported to have been fitted beneath the fuselage of the Canberras, for example, to convert them into ground attack aircraft. (*BBC Monitoring Service* 8.4.76).

Helicopters are normally used to transport troops into areas where guerillas are believed to be operating, and to provide covering fire. A fleet of around 40 Alouette helicopters, complete with South African pilots and technical assistants, is believed to have been left behind for the Smith regime's use when South Africa recalled its police force from Zimbabwe in 1975.

Despite the imposition of international sanctions, the regime has managed to obtain fuel and spare parts for its aircraft, and probably new planes as well. In 1974 it was caught out trying to buy a second-hand fleet of Hunters from Jordan, while in 1975, it was reported that the regime was looking into the possibility of buying Sabre jets from businessmen in Venezuela. In May 1976, the New Zealand government banned the sale of 14 training aircraft to a Swiss company until evidence was forthcoming that the planes would not be sent on to the Smith regime. Two US companies, Rockwell International and Lockheed Aircraft, have also been accused of supplying aircraft indirectly to Rhodesia via South Africa and Italy. (*US International Bulletin* 14.3.77).

Since the intensification of guerilla attacks at the beginning of 1976, the regime has almost certainly obtained Mirage fighter jets from South Africa, and is known to have been constructing a number of new military airfields equipped to take the heaviest transport planes and fighter bombers. (*Guardian* 28.4.77). American technicians are reported to be assisting in the construction of these airfields. (*BBC Monitoring Service* 29.11.76).

## THE POLICE FORCE

The British South Africa Company's success in occupying Mashonaland in 1890 owed much to a private police force of 500 men. They formed the nucleus of the **British South Africa Police**, today the regime's largest single fighting force, as well as the oldest. Around two-thirds of the 8,000-strong regular BSAP are Africans, while the vast majority of the 35,000 or so reservists are white. It has been the norm for many years for white farmers in the border areas to be members of the police reserve. Today many farmers' wives and other white women serve as volunteer police.

As the guerilla war has escalated, the police have come to play a crucial fighting role in the frontline, and, as in the army, a number of elite units have been developed for special security work and clandestine missions. The **Police Support Unit**, for example, known as the BSAP's "mailed fist", is a highly trained and mobile tracking and fighting unit which operates on very much the same lines as the Selous Scouts. A mounted section was formed within the BSAP in early



1977, while other units specialise in urban guerilla warfare, intelligence work and reconnaissance.

## THE GUARD FORCE

For the first two years of the regime's programme of population removal, responsibility for setting up and administering protected villages in the eastern part of Zimbabwe was vested in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On 1 July 1976, however, control of the protected villages was taken over by the Ministry of Defence and a new security force unit, the **Guard Force**, was put into full operation.

The Guard Force has enabled white Ministry of Internal Affairs officials and regular troops on sentry duty in the protected villages, to be released for more active service in the front line. It is made up to a large extent of African volunteers, many of them ex-regular army and police, plus some whites, usually from the older age groups and trained to take overall charge of villages as keep commanders.

The Guard Force is the fastest growing section of the security forces and is intended to reach some 12,500 men trained in anti-ambush drill, landmine detection and weapons use. In 1977 its strength was estimated at around 1,000 men. (*The Military Balance 1977-8*). The first commander, Major-General Andrew Rawlins, previously served with the British Army in Malaya, where similar techniques of population removal and control were used. In February 1977 he was promoted to a new post in the department of the Prime Minister, as Director of Psychological Warfare.

Employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have also taken on overt military functions as the war has developed. In 1976 a new grade of African District Security Assistants was established, who are given four weeks counter-insurgency training. All Internal Affairs officials in the rural areas carry arms as a matter of course.

## AFRICANS IN THE SECURITY FORCES

Under the 1976 National Services Act, provision has been made for conscripting certain categories of Africans for military service.

From the regime's point of view the security risks inherent in calling up men who may well have friends and relatives in the guerilla movement and are themselves active sympathisers of the armed liberation struggle, are clearly immense. No concrete proposals for African call-ups had emerged by mid-1977, although African apprentices and university graduates had both been suggested as possible candidates. Extending conscription to white women, many of whom already serve as volunteers in the Police Reserve, would seem a more realistic way for the security forces to meet their growing manpower needs. \*(see page 62).



Africans, however, do serve as regulars in the armed forces, chiefly with the British South Africa Police and the Rhodesian African Rifles. Black regulars are in fact in a majority, outnumbering white full-timers by about two to one in the army and three to one in the police. They constitute the basis of the Smith regime's claim that the war against the national liberation movement has nothing to do with racial discrimination, but is a struggle by black and white Rhodesians fighting side by side, against "communist insurgents".

Like all other sectors of Rhodesian society, however, the armed forces are organised on racially discriminatory lines. Whites monopolise all but the most junior officer grades and are paid far more than their black counterparts. In April 1977, for example, a black sergeant in the regular army was reported to receive about R \$86 a month, plus food and accommodation for his family, while a white enlisted national serviceman, just out of school, received about R \$201 a month. (*Johannesburg Star* (weekly Airmail edition) 23.4.77). In 1976 African members of the Guard Force, posted to protected villages, received a basic wage of R \$60 a month, plus R \$13.50 food allowance. (*Sunday Mail, Salisbury* 12.12.76). Asian and Coloured too, who unlike Africans are liable for conscription, are treated less favourably than their white counterparts, and there have been reports of Coloured soldiers going on strike for pay equal to whites. ("One World", No. 28 July/August 1977).

The fact that wages for black regular soldiers and policemen are nevertheless considerably higher than the national average for African workers, taken with the high level of black unemployment, helps to explain why Africans continue to volunteer for jobs in the regime's security forces. Black regulars in the Rhodesian army are in fact drawn almost exclusively from a single region of Zimbabwe around Fort Victoria. A number of black regulars are known to have deserted the army and police, some to join the guerilla fighters, while the loyalty of those that remain is clearly a source of great anxiety to the regime.

## MERCENARIES

The Smith regime has always welcomed white volunteers for the Rhodesian regular army and police from overseas countries, particularly Britain. It maintains that because foreign volunteers are accepted into the Rhodesian army on the same pay and conditions as local recruits, they are not mercenaries. However, they are usually described as such by the liberation movement and many people abroad. Manpower needs have become acute as the war has expanded, and recruiting abroad has been greatly stepped up.

In July 1977, there were reported to be at least 1,500 foreigners serving in the Rhodesian regular forces, mostly from Britain, the U.S. and South Africa, together with volunteers from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, France, West Germany and other Western European and South American countries. (*The Times* 8/21.1.77; *BBC Monitoring Service* 21.1.77; *Sunday Times*,



*Johannesburg* 17.7.77). The number may well be increasing. Many American veterans of the Vietnam war are known to have been attracted to Rhodesia, together with Portuguese who fought in Mozambique and Angola before the fall of the Caetano government. One of the most notable British military volunteers to have joined the Smith regime's security forces is ex-Major Richard Stannard, formerly press spokesman for the British Army's 39th Brigade in Belfast, Northern Ireland. In February 1977 he was reported to be advising the Rhodesian army on "possible recruits from among dissatisfied British officers". (*Guardian* 5.2.77).

Between 1967 and 1975, several thousand South African paramilitary police were stationed in Zimbabwe and fought alongside the Rhodesian troops in counter-insurgency operations. While they have since been officially withdrawn, numbers of South Africans are believed to be serving in the regime's security forces as volunteers or on secondment.

Allegations have frequently been made by spokesmen for the liberation movement that mercenaries have been responsible for atrocities against local people. According to a report in the London *Times* in April 1977, foreign mercenaries "have been guilty of crimes which decent white Rhodesians would never commit. Some of them are criminals capable of mindless violence. A favourite sport is reported to be kaffir hunting, the indiscriminate shooting of blacks". (*The Times* 23.4.77).

## ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

Despite economic sanctions, the Smith regime has been able to equip its troops with modern weapons and equipment and has arranged for regular supplies of ammunition, fuel and spare parts.

In February 1977, the Minister of Defence claimed in an interview that Rhodesia could continue fighting the war *ad infinitum*. "We are able to get what we need in the way of arms and munitions", he said. "We have access to overseas markets for these commodities". (*Rhodesia Herald* 15.2.77). The regime's Foreign Minister, P. K. Van der Byl, in particular, is reputed to make regular "shopping trips" for arms supplies to Western Europe and elsewhere. (*Financial Times* 23.4.76).

South Africa's help, above all, has kept the Rhodesian security forces afloat in the years since UDI. As well as supplying arms, ammunition and equipment to the regime directly, it has also served as a channel for armaments from elsewhere. In April 1977, for example, French Alouette-3 helicopters and British-made 105mm recoilless rifles were reported to have been sent to Rhodesia in addition to Mirage fighter jets. (See also above under *THE AIRFORCE*).

The Smith regime, as far as is known, possesses no tanks, but a range of locally manufactured armoured vehicles has been developed, specially adapted for bush warfare. The Hippo, a large troop carrier built high off the ground to



withstand landmine explosions, has been supplied by the regime to South Africa and was used in Soweto, Johannesburg, and other townships during the 1976 uprisings. The Leopard, Rhino and Hyena are further models constructed on landrover and other standard vehicle chassis.

## CIVIL DEFENCE

White Rhodesian society is now completely mobilised for the war. It is normal practice for white adults and children, even in the cities, to learn how to handle a gun and to shoot to kill. Permits for weapons and ammunition are freely available to whites and few would contemplate travelling far in the rural areas without a gun, revolver or pistol at their side.

Civil defence schemes have been started in urban areas including, in Umtali in particular, the construction of air-raid shelters and bomb-proofing of buildings.

In the rural areas, white-owned farmhouses have been turned into virtual fortresses, surrounded by high security fencing, alarm systems and floodlights, with sandbags up at the windows. Farmhouses are connected up to the nearest police or security force outpost by "agricalert" radio communication in case of surprise attack, and guarded by police reservists. White motorists travel in convoys, guarded by troops. Those who are attacked by guerillas and described as "civilians" by the regime are in many cases likely to have been heavily armed.

Since 1976, a flourishing civilian arms industry has been built up inside the country, to cope with the white public's demand for weapons of all descriptions. A whole range of locally manufactured, semi-automatic and automatic machine pistols is now on sale, based on Israeli designs and available to whites at prices far below those asked for imported weapons. The regime is also earning valuable foreign exchange by exporting these guns to South Africa and from there, via South African agents, to other countries.

## COORDINATING THE WAR EFFORT

Virtually the whole of Zimbabwe has been officially designated as a war zone by the regime since 1976. It is divided into four "operational areas":-

- **Operation Hurricane**—the first operational area to be declared in response to guerilla incursions in December 1972. Covers the north-east of the country.

- **Operation Thrasher**—opened in February 1976 along the eastern border with Mozambique and centred on Umtali.

- **Operation Repulse**—covers the southern part of the country including all the key road and rail links with South Africa. Opened in May 1976.

- **Operation Tangent**—officially announced in December 1976 in the north west and west, covering the entire border with Botswana, and based on Bulawayo.



Security force initiatives at the regional level are coordinated through a system of Joint Operations Command (JOC), comprising senior representatives of the main military divisions—army, airforce, police and internal affairs—with the army taking precedence. Nationally, Ian Smith exercises a close and personal influence over the conduct of the war through his chairmanship of a War Council consisting of senior ministers and security force commanders. A Minister of Combined Operations was appointed in March 1977 with overall responsibility for coordinating the civilian war effort with that of the military. The Commander of the Army, Lieutenant-General Peter Walls, was promoted to a new post of Commander of Combined Operations shortly after.

After a decade of armed struggle, the Smith regime has officially admitted that a state of war exists in Zimbabwe.

## REFUGEES

Conditions inside Zimbabwe, particularly the mass removals into protected villages and the activities of the security forces, have forced many people to take refuge in neighbouring countries. Others have left to join the forces of the national liberation movement. Many of those leaving have been killed or captured on the border by Rhodesian security forces, but thousands have reached the relative safety of refugee camps set up by the governments of Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia with the help of international organisations such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

During 1976 between 10,000 and 14,000 refugees and exiles are estimated to have crossed into Botswana, while 36,000 entered Mozambique. The exodus has continued since that time.

Zimbabweans who have sought asylum in neighbouring countries are still in a vulnerable position. In August 1976, Rhodesian troops invaded Mozambique and killed over 800 men, women and children at Nhazonia refugee camp in Manica province, on the grounds that they were really guerillas whom the Mozambican authorities were assisting to attack Rhodesia. Yet the representative of the UNHCR in Mozambique and a correspondent from the London *Times* had both visited Nhazonia earlier that year, and confirmed that it was for refugees only. (*The Times* 22.5.76; *UNHCR Press Release Ref./1261*, 21 August 1976). There have been many more attacks into Mozambique since.

Rhodesian troops have also made numerous raids across the border into Botswana, while agents of the regime are believed to operate freely in places such as Francistown. In October 1974, for example, a prominent member of ZAPU living in exile in Botswana, Ethan Dube, was abducted from Francistown by three armed men, believed to be Ian Smith's agents. The Botswana government nowadays endeavours to transport many Zimbabwean refugees and exiles on to Zambia or elsewhere.

Life in the refugee camps is not easy. Both Mozambique and Botswana are poor countries and have also had to make provision for many refugees from



South Africa. In February 1977 senior officials of the Botswana government who had drawn up a list of costs directly attributable to the war in Zimbabwe and attacks by the Smith regime, put the total at over £43 million, with a further £3 million needed for additional refugee camps. (*Financial Times* 25.2.77). In Mozambique, workers voluntarily contribute a percentage of their wages to a special fund, part of which is used to help Zimbabwe refugees. Refugee camps in both these countries, as well as in Zambia, suffer from severe shortages of food, clothing and medical supplies.

## ATTACKS ON NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

The Rhodesian white minority has for many years posed a threat to neighbouring African states.

Before the fall of the Caetano government in 1974, the Smith regime worked closely with the Portuguese military and Rhodesian troops and aircraft made many raids across the Mozambique border to attack both FRELIMO and Zimbabwean guerilla positions. These attacks have escalated since the installation of an independent African government in Mozambique in 1975, and have been matched by mounting tension on the borders with Botswana and Zambia.

The Smith regime maintains that under international law it is entitled to invade neighbouring countries in "hot pursuit" of nationalist guerillas who have escaped across the borders. Any such right is of extremely dubious validity and even if accepted by international legal opinion would certainly not extend to an illegal government with no constitutional authority whatsoever. In any case, Rhodesian security force operations have extended far beyond catching guerillas (whose training camps are many miles from the borders and whose strategy is directed at building up bases inside Zimbabwe itself) to attacks on Zimbabwean refugees and the citizens of the countries concerned themselves. Raids into Mozambique are, in fact, full-scale invasions involving large numbers of troops, armoured cars and jet bombers.

On 20 June 1977, in a radio broadcast to the Mozambique nation, President Samora Machel stated that between 3 March 1976 (the date on which Mozambique closed its border with Rhodesia) and March 1977, the Smith regime had mounted 143 acts of aggression against Mozambique. Between March 1976 and 15 June 1977, a total of 1,432 civilians had been killed, including 875 Zimbabwean refugees at Nhazonia (*see above under REFUGEES*), and 825 had been wounded. (*BBC Monitoring Service* 20/21.6.77).

Rhodesian attacks on Botswana have also increased. Villages adjoining the border have been destroyed by Rhodesian security forces, local people fired upon and killed, and in some cases kidnapped and taken back to Zimbabwe. In March 1977, four Botswana citizens who had been abducted from their homes by Rhodesian troops, were brought to trial before the regime's courts. In June of that year, the Smith regime passed new Emergency Regulations empowering it



to arrest citizens of other countries and detain them without charge, or bring them to trial on charges under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act of assisting Zimbabwean guerillas.

In May 1977, President Kaunda of Zambia reacted to renewed threats of attack from the Smith regime by declaring that his country was in a state of war and warning the Zambian people to prepare to defend themselves. (*The Times* 17.5.77). Night time curfews and other security measures have been introduced by the Zambian government along the border with Rhodesia.

*\* Note : In August 1977 new regulations were published making African doctors liable for military service. A number of black doctors at hospitals in Salisbury and Bulawayo were told to report for army duty in January 1978. (Rand Daily Mail 19.10.77).*



## VII Attempts at a Settlement

The British government's initial reaction to UDI in November 1965 was to denounce it as an act of rebellion and to dismiss Smith and his ministers. Britain remained firmly opposed, however, to the use of force to crush the white minority's revolt, and instead took hesitant steps to impose a range of financial and trade sanctions against the regime. The prime objective of British policy since UDI has been to persuade the Smith regime to surrender power voluntarily and to return Rhodesia to a state of legality under British law. This is not necessarily the same as securing majority rule based on one person, one vote, and self-determination for the people of Zimbabwe as a whole.

Harold Wilson's refusal, as British Prime Minister, to send troops into Rhodesia in 1965 in fact gave rise to much criticism at the United Nations and from African states. Britain's attitude towards the white settlers seemed to many observers to be in sharp contrast with its behaviour in other colonial situations where it had been prepared to resort to armed intervention. Several countries, including Tanzania and Ghana, broke off their diplomatic relations with Britain at this time because of its failure to take decisive action against the Smith regime.

The British government has made many attempts over the years to achieve an internationally acceptable constitutional settlement in Zimbabwe through talks and negotiations with the Smith regime. Since 1976 such initiatives have been mounted in close and open collaboration with the United States government. The United States of America has important economic and strategic interests in the Southern African region and indeed in Africa as a whole which place it in a position to exert leverage of various kinds. Its right to get involved in a constitutional dispute between the British government and one of Britain's colonies, however, has been strongly contested by the Zimbabwean liberation movement.

To date, none of Britain's attempts to settle with the Smith regime have been successful. In fact, the main conclusion to be drawn from the protracted series of consultations and conferences, shuttles and White Papers, is that the regime has never had any intention of voluntarily conceding any of the white minority's powers and privileges, and it has clearly not yet reached a position where it has no option but to submit. On the contrary, the regime has used every opportunity provided by fresh settlement negotiations to stall for time—time in which to recoup its military strength and to reinforce white domination of the African majority. As one diplomatic initiative after another has ground to a halt, more and more African states, particularly those adjoining Zimbabwe, have become convinced that an armed liberation struggle, while not necessarily ruling out negotiations in parallel, is the only way to force the regime to surrender.

Since UDI, the Organisation of African Unity and the vast majority of United



Nations member states have supported the Zimbabwean nationalist movement in its call for "No Independence Before Majority Rule" (NIBMAR). Successive British governments, however, have tended to think in terms of a gradual transition to eventual majority rule, perhaps in the far distant future. This approach was an important feature of the *Tiger* and *Fearless* talks between Harold Wilson and Ian Smith in 1966 and 1968, and of the agreement reached in 1971 between the regime and the British Conservative Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas Home. While the British government has since accepted the necessity for NIBMAR, its most recent proposals, outlined in a White Paper published in September 1977, still assume that many crucial institutions of white power, outside the formal structure of government, will be retained at least in part after independence.

It is inconceivable, given a policy of international economic sanctions, that white supremacy could have survived for so long in Zimbabwe without substantial support from outside. South Africa, above all, has ensured that all-important supplies of military equipment, arms and ammunition, petrol and fuel oil have continued to reach the regime, in addition to other trade and investment. The example of South Africa's own apartheid system, based as it is on institutionalised racism and the use of military force to crush all opposition, indicates that the Vorster government has little interest in encouraging the advent of a genuinely independent and democratic African state in Zimbabwe. The British government, however, has always refused to countenance the extension of economic sanctions against South Africa, the chief sanctions-breaker. It has instead approached the Vorster government as a potential ally in its dealings with Smith, and as the only country in a position to pressurise the regime into accepting a settlement. It is most unlikely that any settlement plan to which the South African government is prepared to lend its support would be acceptable to the Zimbabwean liberation movement.

The crucial difference between the British government and the Zimbabwean nationalist movement in the search for independence has always centred on their definitions of the problem. As far as the British government is concerned, the main questions are constitutional ones arising out of the illegality of the present regime. For the liberation movement, however, the priority is to win freedom from colonial rule—a form of domination which in Zimbabwe's case has involved racial discrimination of a particularly oppressive kind. This is a fight which has been going on for nearly a century, and in which the Smith regime's decision to declare its independence unilaterally was but one stage in the consolidation of white power. In the absence of a firm commitment by Britain to the ending of colonial patterns of exploitation in Zimbabwe, its view of what would constitute an acceptable settlement will remain at variance with that of the liberation movement.

The chronology that follows highlights the main events in Britain's attempts since UDI to secure a constitutional settlement in Zimbabwe. They are not necessarily the most significant events as far as the long-term future of the



Zimbabwean people is concerned. In particular, the chronology makes no attempt to document the development of the armed struggle against the forces of the Smith regime—a struggle which before all else, has forced Smith to the international negotiating table.

**11 November 1965 :** The Smith regime declares UDI.

**April 1966:** The United Nations Security Council mandates Britain to use force to block the illegal unloading of oil for Rhodesia at the Mozambican port of Beira. Britain despatches the aircraft carrier *Ark Royal* and the frigates *Rhyl* and *Lowestoft* to intercept any oil tankers which may attempt to dock at Beira. (The “Beira Patrol” was finally withdrawn by Britain in June 1975, when Mozambique achieved its independence).

**2-4 December 1966:** The first negotiations between Harold Wilson and Ian Smith take place on board the *HMS Tiger* off Gibraltar. The British government's draft settlement proposals, providing for independence under a white minority government and a constitution with a qualified franchise, are rejected by the regime on Smith's return to Salisbury.

**March 1968:** Following the execution in Salisbury of five Africans sentenced to death in connection with guerilla activity, the British Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. George Thompson, informs the House of Commons that “in present circumstances there can be no question of resuming contacts with the present regime”. (*The Times* 12.3.68)

**July 1968:** The Privy Council in London, Rhodesia's final court of appeal under the 1961 constitution, rules in the case of an appeal by Daniel Madzimbamuto against his detention order that the Smith regime is illegal and that all legislation passed by it since UDI is invalid. The Rhodesian judiciary subsequently ignores this decision, maintaining that the regime has obtained internal *de jure* status.

**9-13 October 1968:** Ian Smith and Harold Wilson meet for a second time on board *H.M.S. Fearless*, off Gibraltar. The draft British proposals, again providing for a longterm transition to eventual majority rule, are once again rejected by the Smith regime.

Many British Labour backbenchers are also strongly opposed to the proposals on the grounds that they would permit white domination to persist for the foreseeable future.

**January 1969:** Harold Wilson, as the author of the “Fearless” proposals, is opposed by all but four Commonwealth leaders at the 1969 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London. Most of the Heads of State emphasise that these proposals are unacceptable as the constitution of an independent Zimbabwe and should therefore be withdrawn. The British government, however, later states that the “Fearless” proposals remain on the table.

**24 June 1969:** Following the white Rhodesian electorate's approval, by referendum, of the regime's proposed republican constitution, the British Foreign Secretary announces that all diplomatic contacts with Rhodesia are to cease. The Governor General, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, resigns, the British Residual Mission in Rhodesia is withdrawn; and Rhodesia House in London is ordered to close within three weeks.

**2 March 1970:** Ian Smith proclaims Rhodesia a republic. On 6 March, Britain, together with the United States vetoes a resolution in the United Nations Security



Council to impose tougher sanctions and to use force if necessary against the Rhodesian regime.

**June 1970:** Edward Heath's Conservative government is returned to power in the British general election.

**November 1970:** Sir Alec Douglas-Home, British Foreign Secretary, informs the House of Commons that highly secret talks have been taking place in Pretoria between British and Rhodesian diplomats, aimed at restarting full scale settlement negotiations.

**June 1971:** Following further exchanges of messages between Salisbury and London, Lord Goodman, a former adviser to Harold Wilson, pays a secret visit to Rhodesia to recommence negotiations with the Smith regime on the basis of the 1969 republican constitution. He is followed by a team of officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth office, led by Sir Philip Adams.

**24 November 1971:** At the close of a ten-day visit to Rhodesia, Sir Alec Douglas-Home issues a joint statement with Ian Smith announcing that agreement has been reached "on proposals designed to bring to an end the constitutional dispute between the two countries". White Papers giving the details of the proposals are subsequently released simultaneously in Salisbury and London. Among other heavily criticised features, the proposals provide for the continuation of the nation-wide State of Emergency, no significant change in the present system of land distribution, and the continuation of political trials and detentions without charge. The proposals, which are conditional upon the British government being satisfied that they are "acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole", are rejected by the Organisation of African Unity as "an outright sellout of five million Africans to 243,000 white Rhodesians for generations to come". (*IDAF Southern Africa Information Service July-December 1971 p.493*). The UN General Assembly also rejects the proposals by a majority vote.

**December 1971:** The African National Council is formed inside Zimbabwe to mobilise opposition to the proposals. Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa is elected as its leader.

**January 1972:** The Pearce Commission, consisting of 21 members appointed by the British government and led by Lord Pearce, arrives in Zimbabwe to test the acceptability of the proposals. Despite a promise from the regime to permit "normal political activities" there is extensive police harassment of meetings and demonstrations and many Africans are killed and injured. The full figure of casualties will probably never be known.

**4 May 1972:** The Pearce Commission submits its report to the British government, concluding that "in our opinion the people of Rhodesia as a whole do not regard the Proposals as acceptable as a basis for independence". The British initiative fails and the regime takes further steps to clamp down on the activities of the ANC.

**June 1973:** A British Foreign Office team led by Sir Denis Greenhill arrives in Zimbabwe for talks with Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa and others. A number of meetings subsequently take place between Smith and Bishop Muzorewa.

**June 1974:** Ian Smith and Bishop Muzorewa agree on proposals providing for parity in the Rhodesian parliament in 40 to 60 years. They are unanimously rejected by the ANC central committee.



**December 1974:** Following a series of contacts between the Smith regime and emissaries from Zambia and South Africa, talks take place in Lusaka involving delegations from ZANU, ZAPU and the ANC, President Kaunda of Zambia, President Nyerere of Tanzania, President Khama of Botswana, FRELIMO President Samora Machel, and officials of the Smith regime. A number of nationalist leaders, including Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe and Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, are released from detention by the regime in order to attend. The talks deal with the unity of the African nationalist organisations as well as Zimbabwe's constitutional future. On 7 December, ANC, ZAPU, ZANU and FROLIZI agree to merge into the ANC as "the unifying force of the people of Zimbabwe" (*see above under MOVES TOWARDS UNITY*). Undertakings are given by the regime which, had they been observed, could have created the conditions for an informal ceasefire in the guerilla war and the holding of a constitutional conference. (The full text of these undertakings, known as the Lusaka Agreement, were released by the ANC in January 1975). They include the release of all detainees and political prisoners, the revocation of death sentences, the lifting of the state of emergency and the granting of a general amnesty. On 11 December, Ian Smith declares that he has "received assurances to the effect that terrorist activities in Rhodesia will cease immediately, and secondly, that the proposed constitutional conference will take place without any preconditions". (*Rhodesia Herald* 12.12.74). However, beyond releasing a limited number of detainees, the regime ignores all the undertakings of the Lusaka Agreement.

**January 1975:** Two meetings are held between the regime and the ANC to discuss the holding of a constitutional conference. During the intervening period, a meeting takes place in Lusaka between the ANC leaders, representatives of the Botswana, Tanzanian and Zambian governments, the South African Foreign Minister Dr. Hilgard Muller and the South African Secretary for Foreign Affairs Brand Fourie. On 11 February the Smith regime announces that certain units of the South African Police are to be withdrawn from forward positions on the Zambezi River.

**4 March 1975:** The ANC breaks off all further settlement negotiations with the regime following the arrest of Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole on charges of plotting to assassinate other nationalist leaders.

**18 March 1975:** Herbert Chitepo, the national chairman of ZANU, is assassinated in Lusaka.

**4 April 1975:** Despite a Special Court ruling that the ZANU leader's continued detention is fully warranted, Smith announces the regime's decision to release Rev. Sithole at the request of Bishop Muzorewa, four African presidents and the South African government. Sithole is to attend the forthcoming meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers in Tanzania.

**11 April 1975:** At the close of their Extraordinary Meeting in Dar es Salaam the OAU Council of Ministers, in the "Dar es Salaam Declaration", confers upon African countries the "freedom to act as go-betweens to facilitate the transfer of power to Africans" in Zimbabwe and Namibia. The Declaration further commits the OAU to unqualified support for the freedom fighters led by the ANC and to negotiations which are aimed at achieving majority rule.

**May 1975:** Bishop Muzorewa, Rev. Sithole and Joshua Nkomo attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in Kingston at the invitation of the



Jamaican government. Harold Wilson promises that Britain will hold a Rhodesian constitutional conference within the next three months, even if Smith should refuse to attend.

**May-June 1975:** Renewed negotiations between Smith and the ANC reach deadlock over the venue of the proposed constitutional conference—whether inside or outside Rhodesia. (It was reported at the beginning of June that both the ANC and the regime had dropped other preconditions for holding the conference).

**24 June 1975:** The regime confirms that Wickus de Kock, Minister of Information, Immigration and Tourism, and four Rhodesian Front backbenchers, have visited Zambia for talks with President Kaunda.

**29-30 June 1975:** David Ennals, British Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, pays a two-day visit to Rhodesia for talks with Smith and the ANC—the first British Minister to visit Rhodesia for 3½ years.

**9 August 1975:** At a meeting in Pretoria, South Africa, Smith and Vorster sign an agreement with Mark Chona, President Kaunda's political adviser acting on behalf of the governments of Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique, and also the ANC.

The "Pretoria Agreement", as subsequently reported in the press, called for a formal declaration of intent to negotiate a settlement by both the regime and the ANC, to be followed by a committee stage inside Rhodesia to decide on the settlement proposals. This would in turn lead to a constitutional conference at a venue to be decided. (*Rand Daily Mail* 28.8.75).

**25-26 August 1975:** Delegations from the regime and the ANC meet at the Rhodesia-Zambia border on the railway bridge spanning the Victoria Falls, in coaches supplied by the South African government. President Kaunda and Vorster meet at the bridge and preside over the opening session of the talks. The talks collapse after Smith has refused to grant diplomatic immunity to the exiled ANC leaders to attend the proposed committee state of constitutional negotiations inside Rhodesia. In a statement to the Rhodesian parliament, Smith says he will now open talks with other "representative groups" of Africans.

**28 September 1975:** Joshua Nkomo is elected president of the African National Council at a congress of his supporters held in Salisbury, and pledges the organisation to renewed negotiations with the regime while at the same time stepping up the armed liberation struggle. (Since September 1975 the African National Council of Zimbabwe led by Joshua Nkomo and the now renamed United African National Council led by Bishop Muzorewa, have functioned as separate organisations inside Zimbabwe). (*See above under MOVES TOWARDS UNITY*).

**31 October-1 December 1975:** Preliminary talks take place between the regime and the ANC led by Joshua Nkomo, culminating in the signing of a joint declaration of intent to negotiate a settlement.

**December 1975-March 1976:** Starting on 15 December, a series of 13 formal meetings take place between the regime and the ANC delegation led by Joshua Nkomo, together with several committee meetings. From 24-27 February, Sir Denis Greenhill, a former Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, visits Rhodesia as the British government's special envoy.

**3 March 1976:** President Samora Machel announces the closure of Mozambique's border with Rhodesia and places his country on a war footing.



**19 March 1976:** The regime and the ANC announce that the talks have reached a total impasse on the issue of majority rule. Smith calls upon Britain to actively assist in resolving the constitutional crisis.

**22 March 1976:** The British government proposes a two-stage plan based on the following principles: acceptance of majority rule by the parties concerned; elections to take place in 18 months to two years; no independence before majority rule; the negotiations must not be long drawn out; a smooth and orderly transition to independence. Acceptance of these preconditions would open the way for negotiations on an independence constitution. Smith rejects the British proposals, describing them as "no less extreme than those of the African National Council".

**27 April 1976:** In a major policy speech delivered in Lusaka in the course of a two-week tour of African countries, the US Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger confirms that the British settlement proposals have United States backing and appeals to South Africa to use its influence to bring about majority rule. He also promises that the US will take steps to fully impose economic sanctions against the Smith regime. In Salisbury, Smith announces that he is bringing four tribal chiefs and six other Africans into the Rhodesian Front government.

**19 September 1976:** Dr. Kissinger meets Smith in Pretoria and announces that a plan has been agreed by all parties concerned to bring about a peaceful settlement.

**24 September 1976:** Smith announces his acceptance of the Kissinger plan in a television and radio broadcast, and gives his version of the contents. They include:

- agreement by the Smith regime to majority rule within two years;
- an immediate meeting between the regime and African leaders to organise an interim government;
- the interim government to consist of a Council of State and a Council of Ministers, comprised of both black and white members but organised in such a way as to leave the whites with an effective veto;
- the Ministers of Defence and Law and Order to remain in white hands during the interim period;
- sanctions to be lifted and all acts of war to cease upon the establishment of the interim government;
- the establishment of an international trust fund to assure the country's economic development.

**26 September 1976:** The Presidents of the five front-line states—Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia—state that to accept the Kissinger plan as outlined by Smith "would be tantamount to legalising the colonialist and racist structures of power". They call upon the British government to immediately convene a conference outside Zimbabwe with "the authentic and legitimate representatives" of the people to establish a transitional government, prior to the holding of a full constitutional conference. (*The Times* 27.9.76) Three days later the British government announces its decision to convene such a conference.

**9 October 1976:** Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe announce that ZAPU and ZANU have formed the Patriotic Front and will be sending a joint delegation to the proposed conference. They put forward a series of conditions without which any talk of settlement will in the view of the liberation movement have little meaning. These include: the lifting of the nationwide State of Emergency; the abolition of



the protected villages; the lifting of all restrictions on political activity; the release of all those sentenced to death, other political prisoners and detainees; the suspension of political trials; and the safe return to Zimbabwe of all members of the liberation movement.

**28 October 1976:** Talks open in Geneva under the chairmanship of Sir Ivor Richard, Britain's Permanent Representative to the United Nations. The four nationalist delegations participating are led by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe (allied in the Patriotic Front), Bishop Muzorewa and Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole. Smith leads a Rhodesian Front delegation. Much of the first month of the talks is taken up by discussion of an independence date, eventually set by Britain as 1 March 1978.

**14 December 1976:** The Geneva talks are adjourned by the British government until 17 January 1977. The Smith regime has throughout refused to consider any proposals other than its own version of the Kissinger plan.

**End December 1976/January 1977:** Ivor Richard tours Southern Africa for consultations with the front line states, the South African government, Zimbabwean nationalist leaders and the Smith regime.

**9 January 1977:** Following a two-day summit meeting in Lusaka between Presidents Kaunda, Machel and Nyerere, and senior ministers from Angola and Mozambique, the front line states resolve to give "full political, moral and diplomatic support" to the Patriotic Front led by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe.

**10 January 1977:** The British government informs the various participants in the Geneva constitutional conference that the talks have been postponed and will not resume on 17 January as planned.

**20 January 1977:** Ivor Richard arrives in Salisbury on the second leg of his tour and presents Smith with a working paper on Britain's proposals for an interim government. They envisage a British resident commissioner who would chair a majority black Council of Ministers and a National Security Council.

**24 January 1977:** Smith rejects the British proposals and later confirms his intention to seek an "internal settlement". Ivor Richard declares at a press conference in Salisbury that the Geneva talks have broken down irretrievably.

**11 February 1977:** Following discussions in London between the US Ambassador to the UN, Andrew Young, Ivor Richard, and other British and US officials, Britain and the United States agree to mount a fresh settlement initiative.

**11 March 1977:** The British Prime Minister, James Callaghan, announces at the close of talks with US President Jimmy Carter that Britain is ready to resume negotiations with the Smith regime. A new settlement plan which has the support of the US has been worked out in co-operation with South Africa, involving "guarantees" of economic leverage by the Vorster government that Smith will accept a two-year transition to majority rule. (*Guardian* 18.3.77).

**29 March 1977:** Smith claims in a policy statement that he had never accepted the principle of majority rule within two years as such, but only as part of the comprehensive package deal offered to him by Kissinger. The two year period would in any event commence *after* the establishment of an interim government in terms of the Anglo-American plan.

**10-17 April 1977:** British Foreign Secretary Dr. David Owen tours Southern Africa. On 11 April, he confirms that the current British plan is for a British-organised conference, possibly chaired by himself and with active US participation, to draw up an independence constitution. The problem of effecting a transfer of



power to the majority would be left on one side for the time being. On 14 April the US announce that they are willing to sponsor the conference along with Britain, and to send a delegation.

**15 April 1977:** Dr. Owen arrives in Salisbury to consult opinion, the first British Foreign Secretary to visit Rhodesia since Sir Alec Douglas-Home in 1971.

**18 April 1977:** An Emergency Congress of the Rhodesian Front renews Smith's open mandate to negotiate a settlement.

**25 May 1977:** John Graham, British Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Stephen Low, US Ambassador to Zambia, arrive in Salisbury as envoys of the British and American governments to test opinion on the Anglo-American plan for a constitutional conference.

**26 May 1977:** Ambassador Young makes it clear at a news conference in London that the idea of American "co-sponsorship" of a constitutional conference—which had been strongly criticised by the Patriotic Front—has been dropped. "But there's no question that we are on board". (*Guardian* 27.5.77).

**19 June 1977:** The London *Observer* publishes details of secret documents issued in October 1976 to white Rhodesian politicians and military officers, which reveal that the regime never had any intention of reaching a negotiated settlement on the basis of its apparent acceptance of the Kissinger package.

**7-10 July 1977:** The Anglo-American envoys, John Graham and Stephen Low, visit Salisbury for a second round of consultations on a revised package.

**18 July 1977:** Smith announces plans to hold a general election prior to setting up a broadly-based multiracial government and formulating a new constitution.

**12 August 1977:** Talks take place in London between Dr. Owen, the US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the South African Foreign Minister "Pik" Botha. On his return to Johannesburg, Botha reiterates South Africa's refusal to put pressure on Smith to accept the Anglo-American settlement terms.

**29 August 1977:** In the course of a tour of African countries, Dr. Owen and Andrew Young meet Vorster and Pik Botha in Pretoria for consultations on the Anglo-American proposals.

**31 August 1977:** The Rhodesian Front wins all 50 seats in the House of Assembly in the Rhodesian elections.

**1 September 1977:** The Anglo-American settlement proposals, published in the form of a British White Paper, are released simultaneously in London, Washington and Salisbury. Dr. Owen and Ambassador Young visit Rhodesia to present the proposals personally to the regime. The proposals, "for the restoration of legality in Rhodesia and the settlement of the Rhodesian problem", are based on the following elements:-

1. The surrender of power by the illegal regime and a return to legality.
2. An orderly and peaceful transition to independence in the course of 1978.
3. Free and impartial elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage.
4. The establishment by the British Government of a transitional administration, with the task of conducting the elections for an independent government.
5. A United Nations presence, including a United Nations force, during the transitional period.



6. An Independence Constitution providing for a democratically elected government, the abolition of discrimination, the protection of individual human rights and the independence of the judiciary.
7. A Development Fund to revive the economy of the country which the United Kingdom and the United States view as predicated upon the implementation of the settlement as a whole.

Three appendices to the White Paper deal with the details of a proposed independence constitution, the arrangements for the transitional period leading to independence, and the proposed Zimbabwe Development Fund. The arrangements for the transitional period, in particular, envisage the retention of a number of institutions which have been essential to the survival of the regime, namely the judiciary, the public service and the police. (*"Rhodesia—Proposals for a Settlement"* HMSO Cmnd. 6919).

In a separate statement on law and order issued in Salisbury, Dr. Owen confirms that not only will the regime's police force be preserved intact during the transitional period but that only certain units of the regular army such as the Selous Scouts, will be disbanded during the transitional period. (*Guardian* 2.9.77). The British Government nominates Field Marshall Lord Carver, formerly Chief of British Defence Staff, as resident commissioner designate. In this post, Lord Carver would exercise full legislative and executive powers during the transitional period.

**18 September 1977:** Smith announces that he will shelve his own internal settlement plan while the Anglo-American proposals are being considered.

**30 September 1977:** The UN Security Council approves a resolution appointing Major General Prem Chand, of India, as the UN Special Representative to work with Lord Carver to secure a ceasefire in Rhodesia. Major General Chand, a retired Indian army officer, was formerly head of the UN peace-keeping force in Cyprus.



## Selected bibliography and suggestions for further reading

### History and background to the regime's racial laws and practices :-

"*Racism and apartheid in Southern Africa—Rhodesia*" a book of data by Reginald Austin, The Unesco Press, Paris 1975 (available in the U.K. from Her Majesty's Stationery Office, price £1.05).

"*Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia*", a legal study by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), published by the Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, and the ICJ, Geneva, March 1976, price £1.

"*Rhodesia—The Struggle for a Birthright*" by Eshmael Mlambo, published by C. Hurst & Company, London 1972.

### The economy and labour relations :-

The Mambo Press, Gwelo, Rhodesia have published a series of studies of the distribution of income and wealth, wages and working conditions, contract labour and unemployment in Rhodesia. *Mambo Occasional Papers, Socio-Economic Series* Nos. 1-9, are available in the U.K. from the Catholic Institute for International Relations.

The Smith regime's economic links with South Africa are examined in "*Rhodesia: South Africa's Sixth Province*", by John Sprack, International Defence and Aid Fund 1974, price 35p. This also examines the connections between Rhodesia and South Africa in land and labour policy, repressive legislation and military collaboration.

Information about the companies operating in Rhodesia can be found in the reports of the *United Nations Special Committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples*; (the "Committee of 24"). A list of British companies with subsidiaries in Rhodesia is available from the British Anti-Apartheid Movement.

### Political prisoners and detainees :-

"*Ian Smith's Hostages—Political Prisoners in Rhodesia*", International Defence & Aid Fund, December 1976, price £1. Contains a comprehensive record of all known political prisoners and detainees, together with background material on prison conditions, political trials, torture and assault and the repression of nationalist organisations.

"*Rhodesian Black behind Bars*" by Didymus Mutasa, published by A. R. Mowbray & Co. Ltd., London and Oxford, 1974. The author was detained for two years, mainly in solitary confinement.

"*Civilised Standards in Rhodesia—The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act*", International Defence and Aid Fund Fact Paper No. 1, price 20p. Examines the workings of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and the use to which it has been put to suppress African political activity.



See also *FOCUS on political repression in Southern Africa*, the bimonthly news magazine of the International Defence and Aid Fund. This also covers security measures taken by the regime in the war zones, repressive legislation, military expenditure, etc. Available from IDAF at a subscription of £3 per year for 6 issues, £5 airmail.

### **The armed struggle :-**

A series of studies of conditions in the war zones and security force actions against the resident African population prepared by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, has been published by the Catholic Institute for International Relations, London:

"*The Man in the Middle—Torture, Resettlement and Eviction*", May 1975, price 50p. Examines the workings of the regime's protected village policy.

"*Civil War in Rhodesia—Abduction, torture and death in the Counter-Insurgency Campaign*", September 1976, price £1.

"*Civil War in Rhodesia—Bulletin No. 1*", November 1976.

"*Rhodesia—The Propaganda War*", September 1977. Includes information on the restrictions imposed by the regime on journalists and press reporting.

A detailed account of protected and consolidated villages can be found in "*Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia*", by A. K. H. Weinrich, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2, April 1977.

"*The Fight for Zimbabwe—The armed conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI*", by Kees Maxey, Rex Collings, London 1975, price 95p. A detailed description of the progress of the guerilla war compiled from press and other sources. See also "*From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*", by Antony R. Wilkinson, in "*Southern Africa—The New Politics of Revolution*", by Davidson, Slovo & Wilkinson, Pelican Books 1976.

Regular war communiques are released by the Zimbabwean liberation movement.

### **Liberation movement and settlement negotiations :-**

The documents referred to in Section IV, namely "*ZAPU: the party's ideological concept*", "*Constitution of ZANU*", "*The African National Council Manifesto under the banner of unity*", and the "*Zimbabwe declaration of unity, Lusaka*", are reprinted in "*Racism and apartheid in Southern Africa*", by R. Austin (see above).

Statements relating to the formation of the Patriotic Front can be found in the publications of the liberation movement.

The activities of the Pearce Commission and the response of the African majority are described in "*The Right to say NO*" by Judith Todd, Sidgwick & Jackson, London 1972. See also "*Rhodesia: The White Judge's Burden*", International Defence and Aid Fund, 1972, price 30p.

Up to date news and information on the situation in Zimbabwe can also be found in the publications of support groups, for example, "*Anti-Apartheid News*", the monthly newspaper of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement.



# Index


- African Affairs Act 34, 41
- African National Congress of South Africa 45
- African National Council (ANC)** 31  
(see also pp 35, 36—7, 49—50, 66 ff)
- African National Council (Zimbabwe) 32, 39, 68
- African Purchase Areas 10, 12, 23, 48
- Africans in the security forces** 56
- Airforce** 54
- Anglo-American Corporation 14, 46
- Apprenticeship 15
- Arms and equipment** 58
- Attacks on neighbouring countries** 61
- Banning and censorship** 39
- Banning of organisations** 36
- Botswana 7, 60—2
- Britain 5—7, 8, 13—14, 20, 21, 43—4, 57—8, 63 ff
- British South Africa Company 5—6
- British South Africa Police 55, 57
- Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 37, 47, 50
- Censorship 38—9
- Centre Party 27
- Chiefs** 29  
(see also pp 10—11, 26, 28)
- Civil Defence** 59
- Cold Comfort Farm Society 36
- Colonial rule** 6
- Conscription and the call-up** 52
- Constitution** 25
- Control of the press and media** 37
- Co-ordinating the war effort** 59
- Cost of living** 18
- Curfews and no-go areas** 48  
(see also p 5)
- Death penalty 43—4
- Defence budget** 50
- Deportations** 40
- Detention without trial** 39  
(see also p 15)
- Development of the war** 45
- Earnings by race** (Table) 17
- Economic sanctions** 20  
(see also pp 12, 63)
- Economic structure** 12
- Education** 22  
(see also p 15)
- Emergency Powers Act 19, 34—5, 39, 46, 48, 50, 52, 61—2
- Emigration 7
- Employment by Race** (Table) 17
- Federation, Central African 6
- Foreign investment** 13
- Franchise** 25
- Freedom of assembly** 35
- Freedom of speech** 37
- Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) 32, 67
- Front-line states 33, 67 ff
- Geneva constitutional talks 33, 36, 69—70
- Geneva Conventions 42
- Grey's Scouts 54
- Guard Force** 56  
(see also p 57)
- Guerilla activity** 45
- Identification and the pass laws** 35
- Illegal executions** 43  
(see also p 65)
- Immigration** 8  
(see also pp 14, 15)
- Indemnity and Compensation Act** 49
- Industrial Action** 19
- Industrial Conciliation Act 18, 19
- Lamont, Bishop Donal 41
- Land allocation** 9
- Land ownership** 9
- Land Tenure Act 9, 23
- Land Tenure Amendment Act 10, 11, 23
- Law and Order (Maintenance) Act 19, 34, 35—6, 37, 39, 41, 42, 43—4, 46
- Liberation and the rules of war** 42
- Lusaka Agreement 67
- Masters and Servants Act 18, 19
- Mercenaries** 57  
(see also p 8)
- Moves towards unity** 32
- Mozambique 7—8, 20, 54, 60—2
- Multinational companies 13—14
- National Democratic Party 30, 36
- National Unifying Force 27
- Nationalist parties** 30
- Operational areas 59—60
- Organisation of African Unity 33, 64, 66, 67
- Parliament** 26
- Pass laws 11, 35
- Patriotic Front** 32  
(see also pp 45, 69 ff)
- Pearce Commission 37, 66




- People in power** 25
- People's Caretaker Council 30, 36
- People's Movement 37
- Police force** 55
- Political parties** 27
- Political prisoners** 41
- Political trials** 42
- Population** 7
- Press 37—8, 39
- Protected villages** 47  
(see also p 35, 40, 56)
- Provincialisation** 10
- Psychological warfare** 49  
(see also p 56)
- Quenet Commission 23
- Racial segregation** 21
- Recent reforms** 22
- Refugees** 60  
(see also p 7)
- Repressive laws** 34
- Response of the regime** 46
- Restriction** 40
- Rhodes, Cecil 5
- Rhodesia Party 27
- Rhodesian Action Party 11, 28
- Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) 53, 57
- Rhodesian army** 53
- Rhodesian Front 11, 25, 27, 71
- Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) 53
- Sanctions breaking** 20  
(see also pp 35, 55, 58, 64)
- Security expenditure** (Table) 51
- Security forces** 53
- Selous Scouts 50, 53—4, 72
- Skills and training** 15
- South Africa 5, 6, 8, 14, 21, 45, 46, 55, 57—9, 64, 67 ff
- Southern Rhodesia African National Congress 30, 36
- Special Air Service (SAS) 53
- Special Courts 42
- State of Emergency** 34
- Strikes 19
- Trade Unions** 18
- Tribal Trust Lands 10, 12, 14, 16, 23, 29, 36, 40, 48
- Unemployment** 14  
(see also p 35)
- Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)** 6  
(see also pp 20, 63—4)
- United African National Council 32, 68
- United Nations 20, 21, 63, 65, 66, 72
- United States 14, 21, 55, 57—8, 63, 66, 69 ff
- Unlawful Organisations Act 19, 34, 36
- Urban areas** 11
- Wages** 15  
(see also p 18)
- White settler conquest** 5
- Zambia 7, 20, 60—2, 67 ff
- Zimbabwe and Rhodesia** 5
- Zimbabwe African Congress of Unions 36
- Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) 32—3, 45
- Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)** 31  
(see also pp 32—3, 36, 45, 67)
- Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)** 30  
(see also pp 32—3, 36, 45, 67)
- Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) 32—3, 45
- Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZPRA) 32—3, 45
- Zimbabwe United People's Organisation (ZUPO) 27, 28—9, 49



## THE THREE VELDS & COMMUNICATIONS



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- at least 1,650 Africans are in prison without charge or trial for their opposition to the regime?
- over 100 people have been illegally executed on political grounds since April 1975?
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Other topics covered include: colonial history and the arrival of the first white settlers; the parliamentary system and the exclusion of Africans from political power; the economy and industrial legislation; the suppression of individual rights and freedoms; the growth of African resistance; the development of the armed struggle and the regime's security forces; the British government's attempts to secure a constitutional settlement.



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